Travis Kupp, a member of our Emerging Fellows program inspects the effect of Chinese colonialism on the world order in his tenth blog post. The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the APF or its other members.

Asia is no stranger to colonization both from within and from without. In the 21st century, this approach to national development is generally not welcomed in the international community. Foreign control is now more often achieved by means of economic pressure rather than by brute force. China has followed this norm for the last two decades as an international creditor doling out high levels of credit to developing countries. Sensitivity to the nation’s neocolonial expansion could end up proving overblown if in the end it simply helps fuel the continued growth of the world economy. On the other hand, if China’s financial commitments abroad turn out to be unsustainably fragile, it may disturb the world order as established in the latter half of the 20th century. Either way, this expansion of influence will have Asia the rebalancer of global power.

Africa is the most prominent example of Chinese colonialism and also the place where it may be least disruptive to the world order as currently known. Over the following decades, aggressive Chinese investment in resource extraction across the continent may have the effect of accelerating development of infrastructure and industry. If China attempts to apply in African countries a similar pattern to the one it experienced with the West, it could begin outsourcing more of the labor required to turn raw materials into manufactured goods and thus grow more distributed wealth in the region. It is possible that similar relationships could be established elsewhere in the global South including Latin America and Southeast Asia. These countries could eventually grow into enormous markets for exports from all around the globe, remain in good standing with their creditors, and become stronger sovereign states. In this scenario, China will have secured a privileged position with many emerging economies but will not have abruptly challenged the international order.

However, certain realities of the current model of Chinese foreign investment herald a more uncertain future. China’s continued issuance of large sums of credit will create a situation wherein it feels justified in seizing its new assets on foreign soil if the host countries are unable to make payment. This scenario is not unlikely, as many of China’s debtors have historically lacked strong institutions, resisted global integration, and are not sufficiently resilient to economic hardship. Resentment toward the colonizers in these countries could result in rioting and terrorism targeted at the new projects, which are often accompanied by Chinese staff employed in their construction and operation. Such escalation would lead to the deployment of military force potentially across Eurasia. The real response from the West, keepers of the old world order, in this case may be limited due to their own dependencies on China. Most of the eastern hemisphere, in effect, would have become the new Chinese Empire.

A dramatic shift in the international power structure is no guaranteed result from China’s international endeavors. If the nation’s neocolonialism manifests more in the form of sustainable foreign direct investment, it could result in greater inclusion within the existing framework and could fuel the rise of emerging markets. The resources and benevolent will required to realize this scenario, however, may not exist in reality. It is possible that the severe terms of China’s deals with foreign nations could end up setting the stage for a future in which it not only controls but owns significant resources across the globe, backed up by occupying military force. This latter scenario would cement into existence a distinctly Chinese Asian Century, but not one for which the rest of the world hoped.

© Travis Kupp 2020