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Rhode Island Fire Officials Dodge Jail Time By Framing Band Manager
Citrus Heights, CA
Tuesday, February 07, 2006
RHODE ISLAND FIRE OFFICIALS DODGE JAIL TIME
BY FRAMING THE BAND MANAGER
On February 20, 2003 a fire started in the Station Nightclub in Rhode Island. It was initiated by a pyrotechnic display as part of the band's routine. The result was 100 deaths and many injuries. The basic cause of the deaths was the installation of highly combustible sheathing on the walls and ceiling near the stage area. Now the manager of the band apparently will be given jail time because presumably he authorized the pyrotechnic display. However, it was the existence of highly combustible sheathing in the vicinity that was the fundamental cause of the deaths. Putting the blame on the band manager was a strategy to shift the blame from those who were most responsible, the fire department officials, including those from the office of the State Fire Marshal. Why the fire officials were most responsible for this tragedy is explained below.
GUARANTEED TO "BURN LIKE HELL": The foam plastic sheathing on the ceiling and walls near the stage had an extremely high flame spread rating and obviously was easily ignited. Highly flammable construction material should never be allowed in a place of assembly where many lives would be at risk. It was guaranteed to "burn like hell" once ignited. When material of this nature starts to burn it flashes so quickly, and creates such fast killing fumes and blinding smoke, that there is very little time to escape. With the flames virtually exploding and the acrid smoke spreading fast, panic was assured. Only those who could quickly reach the exits were likely to survive. Highly combustible sheathing has been prohibited within buildings (and especially places of assembly) for decades, going back to at least the Cocoanut Grove Supper Club fire of 1942 where 492 died. Who are the "fire experts" who presumably have been educated to know that wall sheathing that flashes is not allowed within virtually any building, but especially not in a place of assembly? I believe you call them the fire chiefs, not the band managers. The pyrotechnic display that ignited that super fast burning material, if properly used within a normal building probably would have been quite safe and no menace to the guests.
THREE WAYS TO CREATE A FLASH FIRE: The Station Nightclub fire was a flash fire. A flash fire can cause panic and kill people even if the building is in complete accordance with the codes. There are three ways to create a flash fire which can drop and kill occupants faster than they can reach an exit. One way is with a highly flammable liquid. Pour a gallon of gasoline on the floor and throw in a match. This has happened many times. The second way is to sheathe the walls with highly flammable materials or otherwise allow solid flammable materials into a building that will burn explosively fast. This is what caused the deaths at the Station nightclub. The third way is to allow an undiscovered fire burn until it reaches the flashover stage. Fire within a code complying building involving normal furnishings and contents (such as will be found in any home), will often double in size every minute. (Note: For about 80 years of the 20th century any non sprinklered building was not a violation of the fire codes) Then, when the deadly gases at the ceiling level are extensive enough and above a thousand degrees F., what could be described as a chain reaction occurs. The super hot gases at the ceiling radiate downward heating all combustible materials below to their auto-ignition points. Then the entire room or area will explodes into flames. The explosively expanding fire will create excessive pressure which will then accelerate the flames and gases outward in all directions. Flames and pressure from a flashover fire can travel faster than a man can run and may actually knock people down. It is interesting that fire scientists and research engineers knew of this "flashover" phenomenon during the early decades of the 20th century, but they never defined its role in real building fires. Only after I began to analyze it and write about it as a condition that frequently occurred in real buildings did it become a recognized cause of thousands of deaths.
DO NOT USE GASOLINE INSIDE PLACES OF ASSEMBLY: Are we to believe that the Rhode Island fire department officials were so ignorant of the hazards associated with gasoline that they did not realize that a bucket of gasoline should not be allowed inside a crowded nightclub? I doubt it. Well, how about painting the walls and ceiling with gasoline? Should the fire officials allow that? How about sheathing the walls and ceiling with what many fire safety officials refer to as "SOLIDIFIED GASOLINE"? There are only three reasons why the fire officials of Rhode Island would allow the "easy to ignite-burn like hell" foam plastic sheathing to be installed in the Stations Nightclub. The reasons are:
1. Extreme incompetence. Did not know the essential basics of fire safety.
2. Extreme carelessness, a failure to properly check plans or inspect places of assembly.
3. Dishonesty. Fire officials catering to influential organizations is not unheard of.
WHO SHOULD KNOW THE FUNDERMENTALS OF FIRE SAFETY? So, who should know that highly flammable, easy to ignite interior sheathing must be disallowed within buildings, especially places of assembly? Should Daniel Biechele, the manager of the Great White Band be an expert on interior sheathing and realize that a spark from a fireworks display, or for that matter a carelessly dropped match, could end up killing a hundred people? I doubt it. Fire technology is not the expertise of band managers. Would a building owner realize that the sound absorbing material being applied to the walls and ceiling is in violation of the building code, the fire code, the NFPA codes and most other codes or regulations the fire officials help write and enforce? Possibly, but that would be an unusually knowledgeable building owner. Clearly, the people being charged with crimes associated with this tragedy are NOT fire safety "experts". Well, if we eliminate the building owners and the band, and the people who collect the tickets, check the coats and sweep the floors; who are the ones that are expected to know that materials that "Burn Like Hell" have no place where large numbers of people gather? Just in case those Rhode Island officials still do not understand, I advise all of you; do not allow gasoline in any form to be in places of assembly.
FIRE RESISTANT VS HIGHLY COMBUSTIBLE: Buildings where people gather, even homes, are sheathed on the interior with materials that go beyond noncombustible. The normal sheathing for building walls and ceilings is gypsum board (usually called sheetrock) or equivalent, a fireproofing material. One can take a blow torch and hold the flame directly against the sheetrock for five or ten or more minutes. Not only does this material not burn, it prevents the heat from penetrating the barrier and igniting combustible material in contact with the sheathing on the other side. The material that was used for soundproofing the stage area obviously was at the opposite extreme end of the scale. There is nothing new about highly combustible sheathing being a menace within a building. During the 1940s and 50s and probable even later, low density highly combustible fiber board was often installed in the ceilings of homes. These acoustic tiles burned almost like Christmas trees and thousands of fire deaths resulted. If the walls and ceiling in the Station Nightclub had not been sheathed with the "solidified gasoline", the pyrotechnic display would have been a fun experience and everyone present would have gone home talking about the wonderful time they had.
AN EXAMPLE OF A POST FLASHOVER FIRE: The MGM Grand Hotel fire of 1980 where 85 died (and about 5000 who were trapped in the tower above the fire came extremely close to being killed) is an example of a post flashover fire within a "code complying building". The casino was huge and, for the casino itself there was an abundance of exits and a clear path to them all. A fire started in a closed restaurant at one end of the casino. It was early morning and only a few were still at the tables and the slots. Because the fire in the restaurant appeared to be not a serious problem to those gambling and at the check-in desk, things continued as normal as the fire fighters entered. Presumably they would promptly terminate the fire. But, at that instant the fire within the restaurant went into the flashover condition. Flames rolled down the ceiling of that huge casino at an estimated 19 feet per second. Those fleeing for the plentiful exits were overrun by the flames and dropped in their tracks. Fortunately, the fire fighters were perhaps only 20 feet or so inside the building. By rushing back out they were able to escape before being cremated. One got out so close to not making it that the plastic visor on his helmet, which was turned up, was made opaque by the heat before he could get out. When he reentered behind hose streams a few minutes later and dropped his visor he could not see through it.
WHY A COVE-UP OF FIRE DEPARTMENT BLUNDERS IS OFTEN DEADLY: The media, in reporting on the MGM Grand Hotel fire many times, has never reported on how the Nevada State Fire Marshal, Dan Quinan, was first warned to stay out of Las Vegas because he was objecting to major construction code violations during the time of construction of this "largest in the world" hotel, or how he was later kicked out of office for recommending fire sprinklers for the MGM and another hotel. His insistence on correcting extensive fireproofing violations as the MGM Hotel was being built probably saved up to five thousand lives. If the fireproofing of the casino had not been corrected, the roof of the casino likely would have come down during the fire. Fumes were already killing occupants on the top floors and the raging casino fire was sending an enormous flow of combustion gases up the elevator shafts because the doors had failed. Another half hour or so of exposure to the gases and the likely death toll would have been enormous. If the casino roof had collapsed many fire fighters would have been trapped and killed. This likely would have prevented any chance of controlling that fire, which was a very "iffy" situation anyway. Before the casino level fire was finally controlled many of those trapped on the upper floors were already being killed by the fumes. Of course, if Quinan had been respected and sprinklers had been installed throughout that enormous casino, the early restaurant fire would have been snuffed out and no one would have died. As a fire protection engineer who has attempted to correct the code corruption that kept sprinklers out of nearly all buildings that needed them, I am of the opinion that if the dishonesty that kept sprinklers out of the MGM had been adequately covered by the media, follow up disasters such as the Station Nightclub fire would never have happened.
WHERE FLASHOVER IS MOST DEADLY: Approximately 93 to 95 percent of all fire deaths caused by building fires occur within the home. Preschool children are especially vulnerable. The average home in the United States has phony smoke detectors installed; one that fails to sound when there is a real fire (as apposed to toast toasting). Therefore, a fire within one room of a home will often build to the flashover stage before anyone in the home becomes aware of it. This failure to be warned of a fire in progress is especially likely when all are asleep. Once an undiscovered fire reaches the flashover stage the chances of getting out alive become slim. Because a fire within a home will nearly always begin small, if the occupants get an early warning of an early fire there will be time enough to get everyone out of the home. Small fires do not kill. The KILLER FIRE is the one that grows large and deadly without an alarm sounding. The primary reason why fire deaths occur in homes today is because the fire officials have promoted a defective, near useless "products of combustion" device which really is not a smoke detector; and because they have covered-up the deaths so caused by claiming the problem is only dead or missing batteries.
THE GREAT ENEMY OF THE FIRE CHIEF: The fire sprinkler system is the great enemy of the fire chief. The problem is that the fire sprinkler system is amazingly close to a one hundred percent solution to the fire problem. Where the best kept record keeping of the performance of fire sprinklers were maintained 99.5 percent of all fires were controlled. Further, during a one hundred year period only three fire deaths occurred in sprinklered buildings of the Life-At-Risk (light hazard) type, which includes places of assembly. Thus, in sprinklered buildings fire deaths are a rarity. The problem from the fire chief's viewpoint is that if all buildings were sprinklered, a fire needing the services of the fire department would be rare. When needed it would likely be for "mop up" operations (extinguishing an already controlled fire). When water spray is applied to the early small fire it will likely be extinguished with the first gallon of water that hits it. However, allow that early small fire ten minutes of free burn time before the fire fighters arrive, locate the hydrant, hook up to it and get the hose lines flowing, a hundred thousand gallons may not be enough to save the building or the lives. There is no way that a remote fire department and manual fire control can compete with a built-in fire control system. Therefore in order to maintain the importance of the fire services and the funding, codes have been created to deliberately keep built-in protection OUT of nearly all buildings. It did not just happen that for more than a hundred years, more than 95 percent of all Life-At-Risk type building and 99.999 percent of all homes were constructed devoid of BUILT-IN protection.
RHODE ISLAND STATE FIRE OFFICIALS EQUALLY GUILTY: The state officials should actually receive the lion's share of the blame for the one hundred dead at the night club plus hundreds of deaths in homes. Following the fire these officials have continued to help block sprinkler systems in places of assembly. This is proof that these officials were doing the same things prior to the fire. The average number of sprinklers that will open to a fire in a "light hazard" building is less than two. Most often only one will open. Two sprinklers, correctly sized, will discharge 20 gpm at required pressure. The overhead piping probably will be unable to deliver more than 50 gpm to the immediate site of the early fire. Why then, are these officials forcing a business to install a new fire line capable of delivering at least 1500 gpm to inside the building at a cost that can be 20 or 30 thousand dollars? The answer is that this ludicrous regulation is one among dozens of code barriers intended to keep sprinklers OUT of nearly all buildings. This is a strategy to prevent any reduction in the need for the paid fire services. These "public servants" have also helped dishonest businesses sell phony smoke detectors to the Rhode Island family. This is a crime that should properly class as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY. When will the media question these officials relative the fact that the smoke density at Underwriters' Laboratories allows the density (light reduction per foot) to go to 37 percent whereas the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), years ago, determined that when the smoke density rises above 4 percent the occupants probably will be unable to travel the exit corridors. A question needing an answer is why did the IAFC KNOWING that the so called smoke detector would allow smoke to go nine times higher in a home (than would allow for safe exiting) before operating, conceal this information from the public for decades.
RHODE ISLAND IS A CLASSIC CASE: The public, and especially the media people, have a hard time believing that fire regulators would help create and enforce regulations that effective prevented fire sprinklers from being installed in nearly all buildings. This is a system that will come close to eliminating deadly fires. I submit this; the sprinkler has changed very little over a hundred years as other technologies made incredible advances. The truth is that those who control the fire codes and the approval services…benefit from fires, and fear that within-the building protection will threaten job security. Still don't believe it? If you are an investigative reporter, are not afraid to take on a powerful bureaucracy, and want a good shot at an award for journalism, do an investigation of the ways by which the Rhode Island fire officials shifted the blame to the innocents and then outwitted the governor. Governor Donald Carcieri, following the fire, promised he would make Rhode Island the safest state in the country. I have no reason to doubt his sincerity. But two years later his plan to force businesses to install sprinklers in nightclubs and other places of assembly is in trouble. Why? The Rhode Island fire officials have inflicted the outrageously costly NFPA fire sprinkler code on the business community. Just to bring the water into a building can cost 20, 30 even 40 thousand dollars. The R.I. officials know the code kills the sprinkler plans of the governor. They know alternate engineering design is available that can reduce costs by as much as 90 percent. They reject low cost sprinklers and they help the NFPA create and enforce the incredibly costly variety. If the Rhode Island fire officials really wanted sprinklers in these buildings, the systems would already be going in throughout the state. Any reporter who is not afraid to look into this situation will come up with one of the great stories of the century.
THE STANDARD FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO THE TRAGEDIES THEY CAUSE: When a major loss of life fire occurs the fire officials go into high gear. First they let everyone know that through their own heroic work lives were saved. Immediately they begin the shifting of blame to others. Yes, the rank and fire file fire fighter is often courageous and the guys that go into the building deserve all the credit they get. But I am not talking about the "smoke-eaters", I am talking about the fire bureaucrats, the ones that often drive the builders and the owners nuts with fees, unimportant regulatory demands, excessive meetings, indecisions, changed criteria late in the construction stage and other costly foul-ups mainly due to ill trained plan reviewers. Far too often the fire fighter who "doesn't make it in the field" is reassigned to a desk job, provided with a book case filled with codes and standards, and becomes a "fire expert" as soon as he knows where to open the rule book to the appropriate page. Fire fighters are trained to fight fires; their competence in engineering, construction and technical matters is often pitifully inadequate. If the plan reviewer/inspector doesn't know what he/she is doing, seemingly no one cares except the builders. They have no say. When a major fire disaster occurs due to technical incompetence or worse, here's the strategy:
1. Absolve the fire regulatory system at all costs.
2. If the tragedy is so horrendous that someone must pay, find someone to take the fall. Assemble the "facts" designed to convict him (or her).
3. Try and convict the fall guy to satisfy the crowd.
4. Use the disaster to the benefit of the regulatory system. This will be a time to blame the disaster on inadequate funding, not enough stations or manpower, obsolete apparatus and whatever else is desired.
WHY FIRE IS SO DEADLY IN AMERICA: Those who are the ones responsible for creating the code, enforcing them, inspecting the building, reviewing the building plans and putting out the fires always avoid the blame. Actually the fire services benefit in many ways from fire and are never held accountable for the disasters. Since there is no consequence for incompetence or worse, the needed corrections seldom come about. One could argue that the Station Nightclub fire was just a repeat of the past fires such as the Pennsylvania Opera House fire (1903, 170 dead), Chicago Iroquois Theatre fire (1903, 602 dead), Ohio Grammar School fire (1908-175 dead), New York City Triangle Shirtwaist fire (1911, 145 dead), Cleveland Clinic fire (1929, 125 dead), Texas School fire (1937, 201 dead), Natchez Rhythm Club fire (1940, 207 dead), Boston Cocoanut Grove fire (1942, 492 dead), Atlanta hotel fire (1946, 119 dead), Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in Virginia (1977,165 dead), Las Vegas MGM Hotel fire (1980, 85 dead), DuPont Plaza Hotel fire in Puerto Rico (1986, 97 dead), Happy Land Fire new York City (1990, 87 dead). Go back over the large loss of life fires of the 20th Century and there will be similarities throughout. Every one of them was in a non sprinklered building. The lack of sprinklers was the one common denominator of all the fires. History is repeating. I believe the following is true; during the past one hundred years there has never been a multiple death fire (two or more) in the United States within a fire sprinklered building where the sprinklers were in service. Yet, with the Rhode Island fire officials in control and with them assuring the press that they are 100 percent FOR sprinklers, Governor Carcieri's plan to make R.I. the "safest" state is in the dying stage. In fact, the plan never even dealt with homes where most fire deaths occur and where the fire officials, for more than three decades, have been helping to sell a phony smoke detector that warns of toasting bread, but usually sits silent when the children are being burned alive.
THE EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE FOR THOSE NOT AFRAID OF IT: The evidence of the corruption within the fire establishment is overwhelming and the web sites that contain the evidence of corruption are shown below. Whereas I was the first fire engineer to warn of the defective nature of the ionization type "smoke" detector, the barriers to fire sprinklers and many other corruptions in fire land, today there are many other highly qualified professionals who are going on record regarding the code conditions that are killers. Probably I am the only one so far to so bluntly refer to the dishonesty within the fire regulatory system as deadly criminal activity.. There is good reason to call it criminal activity because that is what it is. Until the concealed causes of most fire deaths become public knowledge and reforms occur, children especially will be burned alive and horribly maimed by fires that could be terminated with no injuries occurring. I have concluded that the lives of children are more important than the sensibilities of the fire chiefs and the other fire bureaucrats who provide false information to the public. The web sites containing the proofs are shown below. As for the doubters, those who believe that there is no way that the dishonesty I speak of could actually exist; you skeptics need only view a five minute video created by my associates from the International Crusade Against Fire Deaths to become true believers. The name of the video is the "Aquarium Test". You will be shocked, enlightened and very angry after you view it.
www.Firecrusade.com • www.StopTheChildrenBurning.com
www.Expertclick.com
RICHARD M. PATTON, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER
AUTHOR, THE AMERICAN HOME IS A FIRE TRAP
President of
THE CRUSADE AGAINST FIRE DEATHS, INC.
POST OFFICE BOX 196 CITRUS HEIGHTS, CA 95611 • PHONE 916 721 7700
BY FRAMING THE BAND MANAGER
On February 20, 2003 a fire started in the Station Nightclub in Rhode Island. It was initiated by a pyrotechnic display as part of the band's routine. The result was 100 deaths and many injuries. The basic cause of the deaths was the installation of highly combustible sheathing on the walls and ceiling near the stage area. Now the manager of the band apparently will be given jail time because presumably he authorized the pyrotechnic display. However, it was the existence of highly combustible sheathing in the vicinity that was the fundamental cause of the deaths. Putting the blame on the band manager was a strategy to shift the blame from those who were most responsible, the fire department officials, including those from the office of the State Fire Marshal. Why the fire officials were most responsible for this tragedy is explained below.
GUARANTEED TO "BURN LIKE HELL": The foam plastic sheathing on the ceiling and walls near the stage had an extremely high flame spread rating and obviously was easily ignited. Highly flammable construction material should never be allowed in a place of assembly where many lives would be at risk. It was guaranteed to "burn like hell" once ignited. When material of this nature starts to burn it flashes so quickly, and creates such fast killing fumes and blinding smoke, that there is very little time to escape. With the flames virtually exploding and the acrid smoke spreading fast, panic was assured. Only those who could quickly reach the exits were likely to survive. Highly combustible sheathing has been prohibited within buildings (and especially places of assembly) for decades, going back to at least the Cocoanut Grove Supper Club fire of 1942 where 492 died. Who are the "fire experts" who presumably have been educated to know that wall sheathing that flashes is not allowed within virtually any building, but especially not in a place of assembly? I believe you call them the fire chiefs, not the band managers. The pyrotechnic display that ignited that super fast burning material, if properly used within a normal building probably would have been quite safe and no menace to the guests.
THREE WAYS TO CREATE A FLASH FIRE: The Station Nightclub fire was a flash fire. A flash fire can cause panic and kill people even if the building is in complete accordance with the codes. There are three ways to create a flash fire which can drop and kill occupants faster than they can reach an exit. One way is with a highly flammable liquid. Pour a gallon of gasoline on the floor and throw in a match. This has happened many times. The second way is to sheathe the walls with highly flammable materials or otherwise allow solid flammable materials into a building that will burn explosively fast. This is what caused the deaths at the Station nightclub. The third way is to allow an undiscovered fire burn until it reaches the flashover stage. Fire within a code complying building involving normal furnishings and contents (such as will be found in any home), will often double in size every minute. (Note: For about 80 years of the 20th century any non sprinklered building was not a violation of the fire codes) Then, when the deadly gases at the ceiling level are extensive enough and above a thousand degrees F., what could be described as a chain reaction occurs. The super hot gases at the ceiling radiate downward heating all combustible materials below to their auto-ignition points. Then the entire room or area will explodes into flames. The explosively expanding fire will create excessive pressure which will then accelerate the flames and gases outward in all directions. Flames and pressure from a flashover fire can travel faster than a man can run and may actually knock people down. It is interesting that fire scientists and research engineers knew of this "flashover" phenomenon during the early decades of the 20th century, but they never defined its role in real building fires. Only after I began to analyze it and write about it as a condition that frequently occurred in real buildings did it become a recognized cause of thousands of deaths.
DO NOT USE GASOLINE INSIDE PLACES OF ASSEMBLY: Are we to believe that the Rhode Island fire department officials were so ignorant of the hazards associated with gasoline that they did not realize that a bucket of gasoline should not be allowed inside a crowded nightclub? I doubt it. Well, how about painting the walls and ceiling with gasoline? Should the fire officials allow that? How about sheathing the walls and ceiling with what many fire safety officials refer to as "SOLIDIFIED GASOLINE"? There are only three reasons why the fire officials of Rhode Island would allow the "easy to ignite-burn like hell" foam plastic sheathing to be installed in the Stations Nightclub. The reasons are:
1. Extreme incompetence. Did not know the essential basics of fire safety.
2. Extreme carelessness, a failure to properly check plans or inspect places of assembly.
3. Dishonesty. Fire officials catering to influential organizations is not unheard of.
WHO SHOULD KNOW THE FUNDERMENTALS OF FIRE SAFETY? So, who should know that highly flammable, easy to ignite interior sheathing must be disallowed within buildings, especially places of assembly? Should Daniel Biechele, the manager of the Great White Band be an expert on interior sheathing and realize that a spark from a fireworks display, or for that matter a carelessly dropped match, could end up killing a hundred people? I doubt it. Fire technology is not the expertise of band managers. Would a building owner realize that the sound absorbing material being applied to the walls and ceiling is in violation of the building code, the fire code, the NFPA codes and most other codes or regulations the fire officials help write and enforce? Possibly, but that would be an unusually knowledgeable building owner. Clearly, the people being charged with crimes associated with this tragedy are NOT fire safety "experts". Well, if we eliminate the building owners and the band, and the people who collect the tickets, check the coats and sweep the floors; who are the ones that are expected to know that materials that "Burn Like Hell" have no place where large numbers of people gather? Just in case those Rhode Island officials still do not understand, I advise all of you; do not allow gasoline in any form to be in places of assembly.
FIRE RESISTANT VS HIGHLY COMBUSTIBLE: Buildings where people gather, even homes, are sheathed on the interior with materials that go beyond noncombustible. The normal sheathing for building walls and ceilings is gypsum board (usually called sheetrock) or equivalent, a fireproofing material. One can take a blow torch and hold the flame directly against the sheetrock for five or ten or more minutes. Not only does this material not burn, it prevents the heat from penetrating the barrier and igniting combustible material in contact with the sheathing on the other side. The material that was used for soundproofing the stage area obviously was at the opposite extreme end of the scale. There is nothing new about highly combustible sheathing being a menace within a building. During the 1940s and 50s and probable even later, low density highly combustible fiber board was often installed in the ceilings of homes. These acoustic tiles burned almost like Christmas trees and thousands of fire deaths resulted. If the walls and ceiling in the Station Nightclub had not been sheathed with the "solidified gasoline", the pyrotechnic display would have been a fun experience and everyone present would have gone home talking about the wonderful time they had.
AN EXAMPLE OF A POST FLASHOVER FIRE: The MGM Grand Hotel fire of 1980 where 85 died (and about 5000 who were trapped in the tower above the fire came extremely close to being killed) is an example of a post flashover fire within a "code complying building". The casino was huge and, for the casino itself there was an abundance of exits and a clear path to them all. A fire started in a closed restaurant at one end of the casino. It was early morning and only a few were still at the tables and the slots. Because the fire in the restaurant appeared to be not a serious problem to those gambling and at the check-in desk, things continued as normal as the fire fighters entered. Presumably they would promptly terminate the fire. But, at that instant the fire within the restaurant went into the flashover condition. Flames rolled down the ceiling of that huge casino at an estimated 19 feet per second. Those fleeing for the plentiful exits were overrun by the flames and dropped in their tracks. Fortunately, the fire fighters were perhaps only 20 feet or so inside the building. By rushing back out they were able to escape before being cremated. One got out so close to not making it that the plastic visor on his helmet, which was turned up, was made opaque by the heat before he could get out. When he reentered behind hose streams a few minutes later and dropped his visor he could not see through it.
WHY A COVE-UP OF FIRE DEPARTMENT BLUNDERS IS OFTEN DEADLY: The media, in reporting on the MGM Grand Hotel fire many times, has never reported on how the Nevada State Fire Marshal, Dan Quinan, was first warned to stay out of Las Vegas because he was objecting to major construction code violations during the time of construction of this "largest in the world" hotel, or how he was later kicked out of office for recommending fire sprinklers for the MGM and another hotel. His insistence on correcting extensive fireproofing violations as the MGM Hotel was being built probably saved up to five thousand lives. If the fireproofing of the casino had not been corrected, the roof of the casino likely would have come down during the fire. Fumes were already killing occupants on the top floors and the raging casino fire was sending an enormous flow of combustion gases up the elevator shafts because the doors had failed. Another half hour or so of exposure to the gases and the likely death toll would have been enormous. If the casino roof had collapsed many fire fighters would have been trapped and killed. This likely would have prevented any chance of controlling that fire, which was a very "iffy" situation anyway. Before the casino level fire was finally controlled many of those trapped on the upper floors were already being killed by the fumes. Of course, if Quinan had been respected and sprinklers had been installed throughout that enormous casino, the early restaurant fire would have been snuffed out and no one would have died. As a fire protection engineer who has attempted to correct the code corruption that kept sprinklers out of nearly all buildings that needed them, I am of the opinion that if the dishonesty that kept sprinklers out of the MGM had been adequately covered by the media, follow up disasters such as the Station Nightclub fire would never have happened.
WHERE FLASHOVER IS MOST DEADLY: Approximately 93 to 95 percent of all fire deaths caused by building fires occur within the home. Preschool children are especially vulnerable. The average home in the United States has phony smoke detectors installed; one that fails to sound when there is a real fire (as apposed to toast toasting). Therefore, a fire within one room of a home will often build to the flashover stage before anyone in the home becomes aware of it. This failure to be warned of a fire in progress is especially likely when all are asleep. Once an undiscovered fire reaches the flashover stage the chances of getting out alive become slim. Because a fire within a home will nearly always begin small, if the occupants get an early warning of an early fire there will be time enough to get everyone out of the home. Small fires do not kill. The KILLER FIRE is the one that grows large and deadly without an alarm sounding. The primary reason why fire deaths occur in homes today is because the fire officials have promoted a defective, near useless "products of combustion" device which really is not a smoke detector; and because they have covered-up the deaths so caused by claiming the problem is only dead or missing batteries.
THE GREAT ENEMY OF THE FIRE CHIEF: The fire sprinkler system is the great enemy of the fire chief. The problem is that the fire sprinkler system is amazingly close to a one hundred percent solution to the fire problem. Where the best kept record keeping of the performance of fire sprinklers were maintained 99.5 percent of all fires were controlled. Further, during a one hundred year period only three fire deaths occurred in sprinklered buildings of the Life-At-Risk (light hazard) type, which includes places of assembly. Thus, in sprinklered buildings fire deaths are a rarity. The problem from the fire chief's viewpoint is that if all buildings were sprinklered, a fire needing the services of the fire department would be rare. When needed it would likely be for "mop up" operations (extinguishing an already controlled fire). When water spray is applied to the early small fire it will likely be extinguished with the first gallon of water that hits it. However, allow that early small fire ten minutes of free burn time before the fire fighters arrive, locate the hydrant, hook up to it and get the hose lines flowing, a hundred thousand gallons may not be enough to save the building or the lives. There is no way that a remote fire department and manual fire control can compete with a built-in fire control system. Therefore in order to maintain the importance of the fire services and the funding, codes have been created to deliberately keep built-in protection OUT of nearly all buildings. It did not just happen that for more than a hundred years, more than 95 percent of all Life-At-Risk type building and 99.999 percent of all homes were constructed devoid of BUILT-IN protection.
RHODE ISLAND STATE FIRE OFFICIALS EQUALLY GUILTY: The state officials should actually receive the lion's share of the blame for the one hundred dead at the night club plus hundreds of deaths in homes. Following the fire these officials have continued to help block sprinkler systems in places of assembly. This is proof that these officials were doing the same things prior to the fire. The average number of sprinklers that will open to a fire in a "light hazard" building is less than two. Most often only one will open. Two sprinklers, correctly sized, will discharge 20 gpm at required pressure. The overhead piping probably will be unable to deliver more than 50 gpm to the immediate site of the early fire. Why then, are these officials forcing a business to install a new fire line capable of delivering at least 1500 gpm to inside the building at a cost that can be 20 or 30 thousand dollars? The answer is that this ludicrous regulation is one among dozens of code barriers intended to keep sprinklers OUT of nearly all buildings. This is a strategy to prevent any reduction in the need for the paid fire services. These "public servants" have also helped dishonest businesses sell phony smoke detectors to the Rhode Island family. This is a crime that should properly class as a CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY. When will the media question these officials relative the fact that the smoke density at Underwriters' Laboratories allows the density (light reduction per foot) to go to 37 percent whereas the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), years ago, determined that when the smoke density rises above 4 percent the occupants probably will be unable to travel the exit corridors. A question needing an answer is why did the IAFC KNOWING that the so called smoke detector would allow smoke to go nine times higher in a home (than would allow for safe exiting) before operating, conceal this information from the public for decades.
RHODE ISLAND IS A CLASSIC CASE: The public, and especially the media people, have a hard time believing that fire regulators would help create and enforce regulations that effective prevented fire sprinklers from being installed in nearly all buildings. This is a system that will come close to eliminating deadly fires. I submit this; the sprinkler has changed very little over a hundred years as other technologies made incredible advances. The truth is that those who control the fire codes and the approval services…benefit from fires, and fear that within-the building protection will threaten job security. Still don't believe it? If you are an investigative reporter, are not afraid to take on a powerful bureaucracy, and want a good shot at an award for journalism, do an investigation of the ways by which the Rhode Island fire officials shifted the blame to the innocents and then outwitted the governor. Governor Donald Carcieri, following the fire, promised he would make Rhode Island the safest state in the country. I have no reason to doubt his sincerity. But two years later his plan to force businesses to install sprinklers in nightclubs and other places of assembly is in trouble. Why? The Rhode Island fire officials have inflicted the outrageously costly NFPA fire sprinkler code on the business community. Just to bring the water into a building can cost 20, 30 even 40 thousand dollars. The R.I. officials know the code kills the sprinkler plans of the governor. They know alternate engineering design is available that can reduce costs by as much as 90 percent. They reject low cost sprinklers and they help the NFPA create and enforce the incredibly costly variety. If the Rhode Island fire officials really wanted sprinklers in these buildings, the systems would already be going in throughout the state. Any reporter who is not afraid to look into this situation will come up with one of the great stories of the century.
THE STANDARD FIRE DEPARTMENT RESPONSE TO THE TRAGEDIES THEY CAUSE: When a major loss of life fire occurs the fire officials go into high gear. First they let everyone know that through their own heroic work lives were saved. Immediately they begin the shifting of blame to others. Yes, the rank and fire file fire fighter is often courageous and the guys that go into the building deserve all the credit they get. But I am not talking about the "smoke-eaters", I am talking about the fire bureaucrats, the ones that often drive the builders and the owners nuts with fees, unimportant regulatory demands, excessive meetings, indecisions, changed criteria late in the construction stage and other costly foul-ups mainly due to ill trained plan reviewers. Far too often the fire fighter who "doesn't make it in the field" is reassigned to a desk job, provided with a book case filled with codes and standards, and becomes a "fire expert" as soon as he knows where to open the rule book to the appropriate page. Fire fighters are trained to fight fires; their competence in engineering, construction and technical matters is often pitifully inadequate. If the plan reviewer/inspector doesn't know what he/she is doing, seemingly no one cares except the builders. They have no say. When a major fire disaster occurs due to technical incompetence or worse, here's the strategy:
1. Absolve the fire regulatory system at all costs.
2. If the tragedy is so horrendous that someone must pay, find someone to take the fall. Assemble the "facts" designed to convict him (or her).
3. Try and convict the fall guy to satisfy the crowd.
4. Use the disaster to the benefit of the regulatory system. This will be a time to blame the disaster on inadequate funding, not enough stations or manpower, obsolete apparatus and whatever else is desired.
WHY FIRE IS SO DEADLY IN AMERICA: Those who are the ones responsible for creating the code, enforcing them, inspecting the building, reviewing the building plans and putting out the fires always avoid the blame. Actually the fire services benefit in many ways from fire and are never held accountable for the disasters. Since there is no consequence for incompetence or worse, the needed corrections seldom come about. One could argue that the Station Nightclub fire was just a repeat of the past fires such as the Pennsylvania Opera House fire (1903, 170 dead), Chicago Iroquois Theatre fire (1903, 602 dead), Ohio Grammar School fire (1908-175 dead), New York City Triangle Shirtwaist fire (1911, 145 dead), Cleveland Clinic fire (1929, 125 dead), Texas School fire (1937, 201 dead), Natchez Rhythm Club fire (1940, 207 dead), Boston Cocoanut Grove fire (1942, 492 dead), Atlanta hotel fire (1946, 119 dead), Beverly Hills Supper Club fire in Virginia (1977,165 dead), Las Vegas MGM Hotel fire (1980, 85 dead), DuPont Plaza Hotel fire in Puerto Rico (1986, 97 dead), Happy Land Fire new York City (1990, 87 dead). Go back over the large loss of life fires of the 20th Century and there will be similarities throughout. Every one of them was in a non sprinklered building. The lack of sprinklers was the one common denominator of all the fires. History is repeating. I believe the following is true; during the past one hundred years there has never been a multiple death fire (two or more) in the United States within a fire sprinklered building where the sprinklers were in service. Yet, with the Rhode Island fire officials in control and with them assuring the press that they are 100 percent FOR sprinklers, Governor Carcieri's plan to make R.I. the "safest" state is in the dying stage. In fact, the plan never even dealt with homes where most fire deaths occur and where the fire officials, for more than three decades, have been helping to sell a phony smoke detector that warns of toasting bread, but usually sits silent when the children are being burned alive.
THE EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE FOR THOSE NOT AFRAID OF IT: The evidence of the corruption within the fire establishment is overwhelming and the web sites that contain the evidence of corruption are shown below. Whereas I was the first fire engineer to warn of the defective nature of the ionization type "smoke" detector, the barriers to fire sprinklers and many other corruptions in fire land, today there are many other highly qualified professionals who are going on record regarding the code conditions that are killers. Probably I am the only one so far to so bluntly refer to the dishonesty within the fire regulatory system as deadly criminal activity.. There is good reason to call it criminal activity because that is what it is. Until the concealed causes of most fire deaths become public knowledge and reforms occur, children especially will be burned alive and horribly maimed by fires that could be terminated with no injuries occurring. I have concluded that the lives of children are more important than the sensibilities of the fire chiefs and the other fire bureaucrats who provide false information to the public. The web sites containing the proofs are shown below. As for the doubters, those who believe that there is no way that the dishonesty I speak of could actually exist; you skeptics need only view a five minute video created by my associates from the International Crusade Against Fire Deaths to become true believers. The name of the video is the "Aquarium Test". You will be shocked, enlightened and very angry after you view it.
www.Firecrusade.com • www.StopTheChildrenBurning.com
www.Expertclick.com
RICHARD M. PATTON, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER
AUTHOR, THE AMERICAN HOME IS A FIRE TRAP
President of
THE CRUSADE AGAINST FIRE DEATHS, INC.
POST OFFICE BOX 196 CITRUS HEIGHTS, CA 95611 • PHONE 916 721 7700
Richard Patton
President
Crusade Against Fire Deaths, Inc.
Citrus Heights, CA
916-721-7700
916-721-7738
First Url: Crusade Against Fire Deaths, Inc.
