Citrus Heights, CA

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

DAN QUINAN BELIEVED THAT

SMOKE DETECTORS AUGHT TO BE ABLE TO DETECT SMOKE

The Las Vegas fire inspectors were at the grade school preparing to check out the smoke detector inside the heating/cooling system. The heating/cooling system was of serious concern if a fire occurred. Say a fire started in the library. Smoke from that localized fire would be pulled back through the return air duct to the furnace. Then the smoke would be redistributed throughout the school via the supply ducts. Suddenly smoke would be pouring out of the air vents in all the classrooms and the corridors. The kids would panic. But the problem could be solved with a smoke detector in the return air duct. When the smoke reached the smoke detector the detector would trip, the blower would stop and an evacuation alarm would sound. The corridors would remain clear and the kids could all leave safely.

Dan Quinan, the Nevada State Fire Marshal was also present. He was not welcome because the Las Vegas fire inspectors believed they did not need big brother down from Carson City. And what really annoyed them was the crazy way he wanted to test the smoke detector. Dan had two big metal garbage cans placed inside the school and put some paper and combustibles inside. He lit the fires allowing real smoke to be pulled into the return air duct. Testing smoke detectors with real fires inside the building producing real smoke; my God what a crazy idea that was. The Las Vegas inspectors never heard of such a stupid way to test a smoke detector.

So the fires were lit. The blower sucked the smoke back past the smoke detector and the blower just kept on running. Soon smoke was pouring out all the ducts throughout the school. Dan Quinan was not pleased with the performance of that smoke detector inside the duct.

But no one else was happy either. The inspectors were furious that this guy, originally out of Pasadena, California no less, came down to their big city with his cockamamie testing methods. He was making the Vegas fire inspectors look bad in front of all the school teachers. The contractor was screaming "foul, this is not the way to test a smoke detector". The installer wanted his money and now here was this guy with garbage cans and fires inside the school. Dumb. Dumb. Dumb. The principal was complaining that the smoke was fouling up the school. How do we get rid of the smell? The teachers were upset; the kids should be inside studying, not outside running around. Only the kids thought that things were cool.

This is nonsense said the contractor. Here watch this. He pulled out his trusty spray can. He pointed the nozzle at the smoke detector, pushed the plunger down and in less than a second later the smoke detector activated. The blower shut down.

That little spray can looked like a bug spray. But right there on the label in big letters it said, "SMOKE DETECTOR TESTER". If it says, "SMOKE DETECTOR TESTER", that ought to be the way to test a smoke detector, right? Everyone should know that. And right there, right on the can was the UL (Underwriters Laboratory) logo. And the smoke detector itself came with the UL label. And the contractor had installed the system in full accordance with the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) code. What more could any reasonable man want?

Well, for a while it was a nasty situation. The state fire marshal insisted that a smoke detector had to be able to detect smoke. But that is not what the codes said. The code required an installation as per the fire code and when the official smoke detector tester caused the thing to operate, why that was the way to test it. Why couldn't that guy from Carson City follow the rules?

So eventually the Las Vegas fire officials prevailed. Dan was told to stay out of Las Vegas. They did not need his advice. But Dan was a man who believed that code compliance was not enough. The solution was supposed to work. A smoke detector should be able to detect smoke. It was a novel concept but Dan was a true believer.

Well, that not-very-friendly relationship continued for a few years and then Dan did what his enemies were waiting for. He really went out on a limb in a big way. The MGM Grand Hotel was under construction. It would be the largest hotel in the word, or so they said. And it would be by code a FIREPROOF hotel. The walls and floor were steel and concrete and gypsum-board, all "fireproof" materials. Obviously that building could not burn.

And here comes Dan Quinan with another one of his cockamamie ideas. He said that a fire sprinkler system should be installed throughout that hotel. He wanted a fire sprinkler system in a fireproof hotel! What was wrong with that guy? Everyone knew that fireproof buildings do not burn. After all, isn't that what fireproof means?

On November 21, 1980 as the rest of the nation was entering the Christmas Season an early morning electrical fire occurred within a not-yet-open non-sprinklered restaurant at one end of the non-sprinklered casino. The monster sized casino measured 175 feet by 480 feet. Several firefighters who were in the building grabbed a fire hose from the nearby fire station and were about to douse the fire when someone said, "don't put water on an electrical fire". So they put down the hose not realizing that electricity would not have flowed back along the hose stream because, what appears to be solid water actually is millions of drops with air gaps between the drops. The fire burned for a while within the idle restaurant as the few early morning gamblers at the tables ignored it and continued to place their bets. The first group of fire fighters entered the casino doors and moved about 40 feet in the direction of the fire.

Suddenly the fire within the casino went into the flashover mode and thick smoke and superhot gases poured out along the ceiling. Flashover was not a known phenomenon within what is called "fire science" until I discovered that it existed and began to write about it. The "oh so brilliant" scientists at the National Bureau of Standards (NBS which later was named National Institute of Standards and Technology - NIST) would see flashover occur during some of their room fire tests but never correlated it with real world situations. When talking to one of these researchers the phenomenon was mentioned and I immediately knew that this was the answer I had been looking for. It explained fire behavior situations in the real world that defied the normal ideas of how building fires behave. So, for some years I wrote about the phenomenon until finally it became part of fire technology.

When the flashover condition rolled out of the restaurant into the casino it raced across the ceiling at an officially stated 15 to 19 feet per second. The flames and hot gases swept by the gamblers within seconds, radiating downward with such intensity that most were dropped before they could reach the exits. Thankfully, because the fire occurred so early in the morning, the casino was not crowded.

The firefighters who had just entered, upon seeing the cloud of churning smoke rolling rapidly along the ceiling toward them, turned and raced back out of the building. They barely escaped in time. Shortly later, entering again behind their fog nozzles, one of them could not see through his visor. It had been in the up position as he exited and the radiation had turned it opaque.

As the firefighters fought the enormous fire, about 5000 guests and employees were trapped on the upper floors of the hotel. The heat had deformed the "fireproof" elevator doors and toxic gases were rising up the shafts and spreading on the top floors. Most of the 85 victims died on the upper floors. If the firefighters had been unable to control the casino fire and prevent it spreading upward floor by floor, eventually all of those trapped would have certainly died. There was no way out. Indeed it is possible the building would have collapsed.

Now I will tell a part of the story that the media and Club Fire have been unwilling to tell the public. During the construction stage when Dan Quinan, the state fire marshal, started to inspect the building during the construction stage he tried to get sprinklers installed. But the Las Vegas fire officials did not want him checking the fire safety of the building. So, he was ordered to stay out of Las Vegas. Here was a state fire marshal that was forbidden to have any say within the one large city that represented the major population of the state.

One day an insurance inspector went to Dan's office with some serious concerns. The inspector reported that the contractor that was spraying the fireproofing on the structural steel was failing to do the job right. The inspector reported that the contractor was skimping on the coverage or omitting the coverage completely in some areas. This was such a serious violation of safety criteria for the building the Dan Quinan insisted on an OK to go to Las Vegas to be sure that the fireproofing was corrected.

Apparently the word went to the authorities in Las Vegas before Dan got the OK to go there. When he finally inspected the fireproofing it was all OK. But, this insistence by Dan that the fireproofing be standard was eventually a factor in a late night action by the legislature. Based on a bill introduced by a legislator from Las Vegas, during the wee hours of the last legislative session of the year, when the actions ran beyond midnight, the legislature voted that the office of the state fire marshal shall cease to exist several years later. Then the next day Dan's boss was advised that if Dan was not the fire marshal they would be able to restore the office. Of course he had to resign.

Now consider the consequences of what probably would have happened if Dan Quinan had not forced the correction of the fireproofing of the steel. That fire obviously was pushing the ability of the building to survive the fire even with proper fireproofing. If during that period when the control of the fire was very much in doubt, the casino roof came down on the heads of the firefighters, the result would have been catastrophic. If Dan Quinan had ignored the fireproofing problem and not tried to put sprinklers in hotels he would have saved his job. But probably 5000 people would have died the day of the fire. Dan was a prime example of what I saw and experienced throughout my career; if your concern for those who may die tomorrow exceeds your desire to be a loyal member of Club Fire, they will make you suffer for it, and probably get rid of you.

THE LESSONS NOT LEARNED

The above stories about the efforts of one man to honor his responsibility to the public, and the grief that it brought him, are illustrative of a branch of science and technology that has run amuck. More than a hundred years ago the fire insurance industry created three organizations to aid their industry. In 1896 they created the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) to create codes that defined building construction and fire safety procedures so the rating bureaus could better set rates. However, because the insurers profited from fire the intent was to prevent the near elimination of fire. They knew that the sprinkler system could reduce the risk of a serious fire by 99 percent. That would devastate the insurance industry. So, the NFPA created regulations that prevented the installation of sprinklers in all building types except the huge and high valued industrial properties where catastrophic type losses could bankrupt insurers.

During 1907, the fire insurers brought an already operating testing laboratory into the fold so that all the fire related products and systems (including sprinkler systems) could be controlled by the insurers. By controlling the marketplace for protective systems and by being able to also legally "price fix (rating bureaus); the insurers were able to control the burn rate in America and also guarantee (as the burn rate rose) that the monies into the system would be sufficient to maintain the same high retentions (monies in minus the payout for losses).

Because the NFPA created sprinkler design regulations that made a mockery of engineering and common sense, during 1903 the insurers created a branch of "engineering" that would design to the dictates of the NFPA codes and the policies of the insurers. These "engineers" would ignore engineering fundamentals and common sense. They would remain true to the policies of the NFPA no matter what. They are now the loyal members of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers; but I call it Voodoo Engineering. As "fire engineers" they are a buffer between the corrupt NFPA codes and the true engineering fields.

For more than 100 years the FPEs have refused to acknowledge that when "code book engineering" is applied to the fire problems in America; if the code is flawed and corrupted the "engineering" will be flawed and corrupted. Of course it is necessary for the FPEs to earn a living and it is easier to prosper when performing as loyal followers of the NFPA code system. But, the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) has the power of several thousand professionals (or would be professionals) and it would be impossible for corrupt businesses and the NFPA/UL co-conspirators to do things that cause tens of thousands of children to be horribly killed or mutilated for life if the FPEs did not cooperate. The war crimes trials established the fact that carrying out the dictates of those from above does not excuse the actions of those below who destroyed lives while following the path of least resistance. As one example of dishonesty beyond comprehension; the FPEs knew of the deadly nature of the ionization device as early as 1976 (perhaps earlier), yet for decades they remained quiet as this "children killing device" was marketed into millions of homes. Unfortunately, too many fire chiefs and fire marshals have put their faith in the Voodoo Engineering of the FPEs.

Because the insurers could create greater profits by creating greater losses, it was beneficial to the insurers to promote a massively high burn rate in America. The insurers could key the profits to the losses so that the greater the losses the greater the profits. The public believes that insurers desired a reduction in fire losses. It is not true. So now we can answer the questions that the behaviors of the NFPA and UL raise.

During 1966 a fire code was produced that defined an excellent fire detection system for the home. This system would have been close to a 100 percent guarantee of a prompt notification when the fire was still tiny and easy to snuff out. But the NFPA conspired with crooked fire researchers to falsify fire tests to justify taking the reliable detectors out of the code and substituting the phony ionization device for the real smoke detectors. Underwriters' Laboratories falsified fire test to hide the defective nature of the phony smoke detector. Why? UL also "certified" a "smoke detector tester" that would make the phony smoke detector sound even though it is not capable of detecting real (visible) smoke. Why? The answer is that real and reliable fire detectors in the home would have most dramatically reduced the fire losses and therefore the "take" from fire.

When Dan Quinan tried to require sprinkler systems into hotels in Nevada they removed him from office. No doubt powerful special interests were behind his removal. Why? The answer is that if sprinklers were installed in all buildings, the "take" from fire losses would dwindle to a pittance. The intent was to put a block on the use of "life oriented" fire sprinkler systems when the concept began to take hold.

America will suffer a devastatingly high burn rate until the public finally realizes that the so-called "protectors" of America (NFPA, UL, NIST, SFPE and the fire insurers) have been betraying the public while profiting from fire for more than a hundred years.

EVIL WINS WHEN GOOD PEOPLE DO NOTHING.

www.TheWorldFireSafetyFoundation.org • www.Firecrusade.com

www.AmericasHolocaust.org

RICHARD M. PATTON, FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER

AUTHOR, THE AMERICAN HOME IS A FIRE TRAP

THE CRUSADE AGAINST FIRE DEATHS

Rmpatton7@gmail.com

Richard M Patton

President

Crusade Against Fire Deaths

Citrus Heights, CA

916-721-7700