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Monograph

Journalism & Communication Monographs
2021, Vol. 23(1) 4–63
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DOI: 10.1177/1522637920983766
jcmo.sagepub.com

Advertising America: Official Propaganda and the U.S. Promotional Industries, 1946–1950

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Abstract
In the mid-1930s, the notion that the U.S. government would collaborate with the country's private industries to project official policies and shape public opinion abroad as well as at home would have been controversial and considered a violation of the nation's democratic values. Yet, by the early 1950s, institutions and practices were in place to make this a regular activity. Much of this ideological work was done surreptitiously, in conjunction with commercial media, and there was little public or news media discussion demanding exposure and accountability for it. What had once been unthinkable had become unquestionable. This monograph chronicles the development of U.S. "information services" in the immediate postwar years. It chronicles the synergetic relationship between government interests, represented by the U.S. State Department, and major American corporations, represented by groups like the Committee for Economic Development and the Advertising Council in portraying the rapidly escalating Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union in a manner that would secure economic world dominance for American interests in the postwar era.

Keywords
propaganda, U.S. State Department, Advertising Council, Committee on Economic Development, William Benton, Cold War, Marshall Plan, public opinion

Introduction

In the mid-1930s, the notion that the U.S. government would routinely work to shape public opinion abroad as well as at home would have been controversial, seen as hostile to the nation's democratic values. Yet, by the early 1950s, institutions and

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practices were in place to make this a regular activity. Much of this ideological work was done surreptitiously, in conjunction with commercial media, and there was little public or news media discussion demanding exposure and accountability for it. What had once been unthinkable had become unquestionable.

Researchers continue to add to the work on this striking transition (e.g., Belmonte, 2008; Fones-Wolf, 1994; Graham, 2015; Mills, 1956; Osgood, 2006; Saunders, 2000; Wall, 2008; Whitfield, 1991). However, only a handful of scholars have focused specifically on Washington's relationship with private promotional industries to sell the U.S. government's postwar agenda to American and Western European audiences (Griffith, 1983; Little, 1993; Lykins, 2003; Spring, 2011; Stole, 2016, 2018). The premise of the government's entire effort was its recognition that the United States was the most powerful nation in the world, both militarily and economically. By 1945, in short, the United States had become an empire of Roman proportions, albeit a different kind of empire. Political leaders sought to secure and advance America's world status. With military force off limits, the plan called for high-level diplomacy. Unlike prewar diplomacy, the postwar variety employed a wide range of strategies, pioneering what Joseph Nye (2005) aptly labeled "soft power"—a persuasive approach to international relations, involving the use of economic and cultural influences, and the importance of shaping, if not controlling, public opinion. And as with old-fashioned empires, the propaganda work was conducted both domestically and internationally.

One aspect of the emerging research deserves far more attention: the development of the propaganda apparatus was not merely a function of Congress and the executive branch. It is better understood as a product of what C. Wright Mills (1956) termed America's "power elite," referring to the government officials, military leaders, corporate executives, wealthy investors, public intellectuals, and heads of universities and foundations who play an outsized role in determining core government policies. Only with this approach, particularly the inclusion of big business, does the nature and power of the shift in U.S. government work on propaganda make much sense. Indeed, the fingerprints of corporate America are visible on every key development in the immediate postwar era.

One industry that scholars have overlooked was arguably the most important for coordinating and developing "information" and "cultural" policies and practices for the United States: advertising. On its own, the advertising industry had far fewer employees and lower annual revenues than many major manufacturing sectors. Nevertheless, certain attributes gave it considerable leverage. Advertising linked the entire corporate community together, and most of the ads were placed by the largest U.S. firms that sold to a consumer market. Moreover, advertising directly provided commercial media, including news media, with much of their revenues. Commercial media are so reliant upon advertising dollars that they are sometimes considered part of the industry itself. Advertisers were also expert in propaganda techniques; they had elevated the shaping of opinion to an art and a science. Government propagandists were amateurs by comparison. In short, the advertising industry was likely be in the middle of any serious effort to produce a successful U.S. propaganda apparatus.

This monograph chronicles the development of U.S. “information services” in the immediate postwar years, putting big business and the advertising industry in their proper context.[1] Between 1945 and 1949, powerful government interests, represented by the U.S. State Department, and major American corporations, represented by groups like the Committee for Economic Development (CED) and the Advertising Council, worked together to promote their shared goals. Although it was a global effort, I focus on how it played out in Western Europe, the most important battlefield in the rapidly escalating Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The central figure in this monograph, William Benton, embodies the relationships described above. In 1929, he cofounded Benton and Bowles, which quickly became a major Madison Avenue advertising agency at the forefront of radio advertising. By the late 1930s, he was vice president of the University of Chicago and a board member of *Encyclopedia Britannica*. He would become a Democratic U.S. senator from Connecticut in the 1950s and the U.S. ambassador to UNESCO in the 1960s. He also owned the Muzak corporation for a while. I emphasize the 1945–1948 period, when Benton served as assistant secretary of state in charge of cultural affairs. In this role, he guided the Office of Information and Cultural Affairs (OIC), the first effort to install a permanent propaganda agency in the U.S. government.[2] Benton quickly fashioned the OIC out of leftover appropriations from the Office of War Information (OWI). Under his visionary leadership, OIC grew into an elaborate network, with 76 branches across the globe. The OIC worked closely with American business interests, including the CED, which Benton had cofounded in 1942. By 1945, the CED counted among its members presidents and board chairmen from major American corporations, including the commercial media. The OIC’s program included the Voice of America radio broadcast and came with Benton’s assurance that the office did not engage in propaganda; its intent was merely to “inform” international audiences about American life and culture (Cull, 2008; Graham, 2015; Saunders, 2000). Benton and his colleagues in the State Department were alarmed by two developments in Western Europe: a surge of public support for communism and a somewhat lukewarm view of America and Americans. They believed that “a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government” (U.S. Department of State, 1945a, p. 5) would change those opinions.

Benton faced strident opposition in Congress from the so-called “isolationists,” a group of influential Republicans, joined by a smaller number of Democratic supporters, who were against becoming involved in other countries’ political affairs. Initially opposed to the United States’ entry into World War II, they continued to advocate American non-involvement in international matters and protested the allocation of congressional funds to sustain overseas programs. They believed that promoting American business interests abroad should be left to private and commercial organizations without the OIC’s meddling, or what they termed “government-sponsored propaganda” through the State Department. For several years after the war ended, they worked diligently to block congressional approval for establishing the OIC as a permanent agency under the State Department’s jurisdiction.

With funding for the OIC's mission facing obstacle after obstacle in Congress, and the international situation seemingly deteriorating, Benton looked for solutions. Soon, the U.S. business community came to the rescue. While business interests had worked actively with the State Department since the OIC's inception, they were now invited to contribute on a much broader scale, working to convince the American public about the importance of free trade and international expansion as well as encouraging international audiences to consider America and its citizens in a positive manner.

This monograph first reviews the history and development of government propaganda work through the Second World War. The second section addresses Benton's efforts at the State Department to make "information" work a permanent part of U.S. government operations and foreign policy until his ambitions were dampened by the Republican victories in the 1946 midterm elections. The third section looks at how the business and advertising industry vigorously cooperated with Benton and the OIC on information issues, including the "world trade" campaign of 1947. The fourth section assesses the crucial issue that eventually overwhelmed isolationists' opposition to an international propaganda program: the concern that Soviet propaganda was turning Western European democracies away from the United States and capitalism. In this context, the U.S. business community and the commercial press rallied to support Benton and the lobbying efforts in Congress, and this proved decisive. The final section addresses one of the projects the State Department organized in the late 1940s with the Advertising Council and the business community to promote the Marshall Plan. For some of this work, the State Department needed to operate surreptitiously to avoid congressional attention, even as it planned and largely directed the campaigns. I chronicle some of the difficulties that had to be ironed out to make the program effective.

One matter must be addressed up front: the term "propaganda" itself and how it was interpreted and presented to the American public by the U.S. State Department after the war. Propaganda, as a standard source, defines it:

> Is communication that is used primarily to influence an audience and further an agenda, which may not be objective and may be presenting facts selectively to encourage a particular synthesis or perception, or using loaded language to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information that is presented. ("Propaganda," 2020)

In this framing, it is not only an exercise of governments or political interest groups; instead commercial advertising and public relations are propaganda par excellence. Many experts, however, classify propaganda as white, black, or gray. Messages that correctly identify their source and contain largely accurate information qualify as white propaganda. White propaganda is designed to put the source in a positive light and highlight the supremacy of its ideas and political ideology. Messages conveying "national pride" are a good example of this form of propaganda. I submit that the work of the OIC, with its many efforts to showcase America around the world, usually falls

into this category. Black propaganda, in contrast, is characterized by a blatant disregard for the truth and dissemination of lies to demonize the enemy. Gray propaganda, which contains carefully selected information designed to influence the audience's emotions, is more difficult to detect. Its source may not be correctly identified; the accuracy of the information is frequently uncertain. "Planted" news stories and other forms of manipulated news are good examples. I argue that the State Department's collaborative efforts with the Advertising Council and other private interests during the immediate postwar period fall into the gray category (Jowett & O'Donnell, 1986, pp. 17–18; Simpson, 1994, pp. 12–13).

Propaganda became a mainstay of U.S. government policy in the First World War, but as Graham (2015) points out, World War II brought considerable attention to its uses, abuses, and contradictions in a democratic society. "Propaganda" quickly became a derogatory term, frequently used to characterize communication from dictators and bad guys in general, most notably the Nazis and the nation's emerging archenemy, the Soviet Union (Hart, 2013, p. 85). Writing in *Public Opinion Quarterly* in the late 1940s, Special Assistant to the OIC Ralph Block (1948–1949) pointed out that "Americans were suspicious of propaganda as an instrument of government," even when it was used by the United States, and by "creating a propaganda machine in the State Department, the country had created a problem for itself" (p. 677). Still, as Parry-Giles (2002) points out in her work on Cold War presidential rhetoric, President Truman and his successor, Dwight Eisenhower, were willing to take this risk. She argues that these two leaders expanded traditional notions of "the rhetorical presidency" (p. xx) to include "covert means of communication," and that a strategic use of the commercial mass media to expand and legitimize a militaristic postwar agenda constitutes another aspect of the overt propaganda program that was set in motion at a time when the rulers in Washington, and the agencies they commanded, denied its existence.

But the first rule of successful propaganda, at least in democratic societies, is that what looks like propaganda is not to be called or regarded as propaganda, so I present examples of how Benton and others wrestled with the issue at the time. By the 1950s, the matter was settled: the United States told the whole truth and provided information, whereas the enemies of the United States lied and engaged in propaganda.

Complementing Parry-Giles's 2002 study with a focus on the U.S. State Department's role in the production of covert propaganda, this monograph looks at the department's insistence on characterizing its persuasive efforts as "information" and its assurance to American citizens and the rest of the world that its independent, objective, and commercially supported press system precluded any incidents of state propaganda. While Americans were suspicious of propaganda, they did not, as Block (1948–1949) points out, consider commercial advertising as such. The State Department used this to its considerable advantage (p. 677). Perhaps, the most important victory for its nascent propaganda campaign was the extent that people accepted the State Department's definition of propaganda.

Section 1—The Rise of Modern Propaganda: The First World War and Beyond

In the spring of 1917, President Woodrow Wilson faced an enormous problem. He had won re-election in 1916 on the slogan "He kept us out of war." But now he wanted to enter the war, facing a public that was far from enthusiastic about it. Wilson tasked investigative journalist and writer George Creel with creating the Committee on Public Information (CPI), popularly known as the Creel Committee. Its members came from both private industry and government, representing an eclectic amalgam of national leaders. Relying on unprecedented cooperation between government and the private sector, the committee sought public support for U.S. participation in World War I. Academics, artists, filmmakers, intellectuals, and former muckrakers ran its 19 subdivisions. Much of the CPI's strategy hinged on the mass media's assistance. Newspapers, magazines, and the relatively new medium of film were utilized to win public support for a war that most American voters had opposed a year prior. Movie stars like Charlie Chaplin, Mary Pickford, and Douglas Fairbanks Sr. publicly promoted the war effort and emphasized citizens' duty to buy war bonds and stamps.

Also assisting the CPI was America's nascent advertising industry. Utilizing skills and strategies that had previously been limited to commercial transactions, advertisers helped spread the government's campaign. In early 1918, the committee created a formal Division of Advertising, which functioned like a national advertising agency, assisting the government in the same way that agency advise clients. The division also served as a clearinghouse for donated time, space, and advertising talent, determining how these donations could be put to most effective use (Vaughn, 1980). The government was not alone in benefiting from this cooperation. The CPI experience helped enhance advertising's prestige and educated Washington on its uses and value (Jackall & Hirota, 2002). In fact, the estimated $5 million in space and talent that the advertising industry donated to the war effort paled in comparison with the benefits it reaped (Vaughn, 1980).

Excited to have discovered a "magic bullet" for persuasion, emerging experts in advertising and public relations eagerly applied wartime methods to peacetime settings and situations. As business leaders and politicians set out to replicate the CPI's promotional success, propaganda became the new lingua franca. The CPI's ability to turn a war-averse nation into a strong supporter of U.S. intervention showed that propaganda was a powerful tool, making social observers uneasy about its larger implications (Winkler, 1978). Progressive intellectuals such as John Dewey worried about the seeming ease with which Americans had been persuaded. The same propaganda techniques that had helped the U.S. during the war could easily be used for more subversive means. In the wrong hands, manipulation of information could put democracy at risk (Ewen, 1996, pp. 175–176).

By the late 1920s, particularly after the 1929 stock market crash and the Depression, the use of persuasive techniques was on the rise. The term "propaganda" was beginning to take on negative connotations, so the enterprising publicity expert Edward Bernays insisted that business efforts at persuasion be referred to as "public relations"

and treated as a valuable societal function. Unlike First World War propagandists, who indiscriminately blanketed mass media in hopes of achieving universal impact, Bernays applied a sophisticated understanding of social and psychological theories to mediated messages, thus refining the CPI's techniques (Ewen, 1996; Tye, 1998). Throughout the 1930s, an increasing number of firms and industries employed public relations to create benevolent, even flattering, images of themselves in the media, and to augment their lobbying efforts, usually with the goal of reducing government regulations that threatened their profits.

Even more disturbing than the many efforts to propagandize Americans was the use of propaganda in Nazi Germany. The Creel Commission's success had earned it international recognition. Adolf Hitler, in fact, credited much of the Allied war victory to clever propaganda by the CPI, which was able to incite a rabid hatred of the "Huns" almost overnight, far in excess of anything attempted on the German side. Thus, when Hitler became chancellor of Germany in 1933, much of Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels's work was explicitly modeled on American strategies and techniques. The U.S. advertising community was impressed: in 1933, the trade publication *Printers' Ink* named Hitler and Goebbels their "Ad Men of the Year," and celebrated the Nazis' use of Madison Avenue methods. The magazine wrote in its tribute that, using American advertising methods, "Hitler and his advertising man Goebbels issued slogans which the masses could grasp with their limited intelligence . . . . Adolf has some good lines, of present-day application to American advertisers" (McChesney, 1997, p. 18). By 1939, however, America's admiration for Hitler's and Goebbels's persuasive skills had cooled considerably; it had all but evaporated by the early 1940s, when America again found itself at war with Germany.

In the late 1930s, as Europe was being pulled into war, many Americans opposed U.S. involvement. The last thing President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted, according to one historian (Hart, 2013), was to give the impression that he was leading the country into a new battle. Increasingly convinced about the need for U.S. intervention, Roosevelt was cognizant of the need to push Americans to the same conclusion without having the efforts perceived as propaganda. His first step was to create the Office of Government Reports (OGR), an information agency that immediately faced criticism from the isolationists, who opposed U.S. war involvement. They viewed the OGR as "a propaganda machine for the Roosevelt administration" (Winkler, 1978, p. 21). The Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was added in 1941. Mandated to disseminate information about America's defense work and other government activities, the OFF elicited a mixed public response. Thus, Archibald MacLeish's first task upon being appointed its director was to construct "a sophisticated propaganda and information policy around the concepts of public opinion and morale" (Hart, 2013, p. 75), relying on a wide range of techniques and assistance from private as well as public groups and organizations (see also Winkler, 1978, p. 23). MacLeish argued that unlike enemy propaganda, "democratic propaganda" was "based on a 'strategy of truth'"; this "involved giving out honest facts about the struggle, and then trusting the people to make up their minds in the right way" (Winkler, 1978, pp. 12–13).

OFF focused on the domestic arena. The Foreign Information Service (FIS), which was also established in 1941, was tasked with disseminating information abroad. Bill Donovan, who oversaw FIS's information strategy, worked closely with OFF head Robert Sherwood. However, the two men disagreed about the creation of a "world-wide propaganda program" (Hart, 2013, p. 78). Sherwood urged that information be based on "public statements and official reports, in which the source of information was clearly identified," whereas Donovan "favored the spread of disinformation, sometimes misleadingly labeled to seem to originate from one government while subtly serving the objectives of another."

The Office of War Information

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, marking America's official entry into World War II, intensified Washington's need to communicate its goals and strategies domestically as well as internationally. To streamline operations, all existing information agencies were quickly centralized under the OWI. Created in June 1942, OWI was led by Elmer Davis, a journalist and radio commentator, who reported directly to the president. The Domestic and Foreign Branches of the new office became the clearinghouse for all government information, except for that aimed at Latin America. The latter task was left to the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, an agency with close ties to the State Department and headed by Nelson Rockefeller. The OWI advised government agencies and departments on how to disseminate information to their individual publics, although the respective agencies were free to accept or reject the suggestions (Hart, 2013; Winkler, 1978).

Davis stressed that the OWI was "auxiliary to the armed forces" (Hart, 2013, p. 82) and emphasized the importance of disseminating "truth instead of falsehood," both domestically and internationally. Unlike the CPI, which had celebrated the success of its propaganda, the OWI considered propaganda to be "a word in bad odor" (p. 83) and characterized its own informational activities as "education." Initially, the OWI enjoyed strong congressional support, and $26 million was secured for its first year of operations. The Foreign Branch was fashioned out of the existing FIS, although a newly created Office of Strategic Services (OSS), with Bill Donovan in charge, was created for intelligence-gathering. In 1947, the OSS would become the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (OWI, 1945).

Much like the CPI, the OWI relied heavily on commercial mass media. Although the government could not order private media what to produce, it worked with several industries to get its messages before the public. It collaborated closely with the movie industry's War Activities Committee in making "non-binding recommendations" on film scripts. It also worked with industry executives on distribution of newsreels, shorts, documentaries, and feature films aimed at international audiences (Hart, 2013; Winkler, 1978). The overseas market for radio, in contrast, was undeveloped and commercially unprofitable. As the OWI considered radio news to be a particularly effective information vehicle, however, the Foreign Branch leased 14 shortwave transmitters from European commercial broadcasters to launch its Voice of America broadcasts. To

deflect accusations that it was encroaching on private media outlets, the OWI let commercial radio companies broadcast its material, even if that meant sacrificing the best time slots and frequencies (Hart, 2013, p. 86).

International broadcasting was supplemented with pamphlets, booklets, and posters in several languages. An 80-page glossy illustrated magazine titled *Victory* explained what America was about and told overseas readers "an American story that had never before been as fully or directly told" (Winkler, 1978, p. 79). Still, the OWI made sure not to get in the way of private enterprise and focused on "the publication of informational pamphlets and graphics, which private companies could not have produced profitably" (Hart, 2013, p. 86). It also produced its own informational pamphlets for distribution and contracted with major publishers to provide the books for overseas distribution. In exchange for survey information from the OWI about "the kind of books most needed in various countries" (p. 87), publishers agreed to make their products as freely available as possible. The book program dovetailed nicely with the overseas libraries that the State Department was then developing; these continued after the war's end.

From the outset, the Foreign Branch faced a great deal of suspicion and was under constant scrutiny. Its independence of the State Department was a major concern for some; the OWI was accused of using confidential material for inappropriate purposes and failing to take appropriate security precautions. Some questioned why foreigners, who performed valuable language tasks as OWI employees, could express their "passionate political convictions," and accused the OWI's "liberal propaganda wing" of using the office to further its own political ends. Winkler (1978) argues that these suspicions were strengthened by "American propagandists" in the overseas program, "who acknowledged that they made selective use of 'the truth' and shaped it to their own ends" (p. 76).

Although the Foreign Branch was by far the largest, U.S. citizens came in closest contact with the OWI's Domestic Branch, led by Gardner Cowles Jr., a prominent Republican publisher. Much like its overseas counterpart, the Domestic Branch worked closely with commercial media to mold American thought and behavior into forms that would be useful for the war effort (e.g., Winkler, 1978). The radio industry developed a massive allocation plan for how networks and individual stations could most effectively incorporate the OWI's calls for domestic action. Modeling an early version of what we today think of as product placement, wartime programs deftly incorporated calls for army nurses, blood donations, the need to salvage scrap metal, and the patriotic aspects of buying war bonds. The "themes" depended on what the Domestic Branch deemed important to the war effort. While networks and stations cooperated on a volunteer basis, they were keenly aware that radio was a regulated industry, mandated to operate in the public's interest in exchange for free access to the publicly owned airwaves. Refusing to participate in the OWI's information campaigns might raise red flags and jeopardize the radio industry's lucrative deal with government regulators. While no evidence suggests that the government made direct threats, these issues were obviously in the back of broadcasters' minds (Horten, 2002; McChesney, 1993).

Unlike radio, the magazine industry enjoyed full protection from government regulation under the First Amendment. Still, its members adhered closely to the *Magazine War Guide*, an OWI directive sent periodically to U.S. magazine publishers to inform them about specific themes to emphasize. Depending on the need or sense of urgency, magazines would be encouraged to incorporate pleas for blood donations, salvage of fats and scrap metal, purchases of war bonds, and food preservation into their story lines (Adkins Covert, 2011; McEuen, 2011). Hollywood similarly cooperated, stressing some themes and downplaying others, depending on the OWI's assessment of what was most beneficial for the war effort (Koppes & Black, 1990).

When nudging and suggestions were considered inadequate, the government relied on the Office of Censorship to prevent magazine and newspaper editors from getting certain stories and images in the first place. To steer the American public's sentiments and attitudes in desired directions, the Office of Censorship put battlefield images to strategic use. During the early years of the war, for example, when the Allied Powers were experiencing defeat on multiple fronts, the agency, as a matter of policy, censored photographs that portrayed the war effort in a grim light. Photos of dead GIs could not be published, although everyone understood that war involved fighting and dying. The fear was that overly realistic depictions would lessen support for the war and discourage potential soldiers from enlisting. The Office of Censorship changed its image-release policy in 1943 as the Allies turned the tide and began to win battles. To combat American "war weariness," it permitted publication of photographs showing blood and carnage, sweat and suffering. In effect, civilians were asked to compare their home front sacrifices to the sacrifices of the soldiers (Roeder, 1993). Thus, as Koppes and Black (1990) point out, "the truth" became a malleable concept. Although the OWI did not engage in deliberate falsehoods and fabrications, its insistence on establishing contexts of interpretation did not adhere to what is commonly understood as "telling the truth."

The (War) Advertising Council

Among the many industries aiding the OWI, advertising was particularly important. At the beginning of the war, the advertising industry had just survived a tumultuous decade. For the better part of the 1930s, consumer advocates, frequently supported by New Deal administrators, had pushed for federal regulation of advertising. Thanks to clever uses of public relations, the industry had reined in the challenge, effectively keeping the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment to the Federal Trade Commission Act—which was presented as a pro-consumer reform—from posing a major threat to its modus operandi (Stole, 2006). Still, the industry was not entirely out of the woods. As the European war intensified and pressure for U.S. involvement mounted, advertisers, representing some of the largest corporations in America, eyed another crisis. An increasing amount of raw material was needed for war-related products, which left American producers with limited resources for domestic production of consumer goods such as cars, vacuum cleaners, and washing machines. Later, the shortage spread to the production of food, clothing, and other products. As a result, advertisers

worried about their ability to keep their brand names alive. They were also concerned that the situation would put an end to advertising's status as a tax-deductible business expense. If public demand exceeded available supply, an argument could be made that advertising was counterproductive to the war effort, as it would increase demand for necessarily scarce consumer goods and decrease much-needed tax revenues due to the deduction. At the very least, many people argued that producers should bear the expense of keeping brand names before the public and not pass the expense on to a government struggling with empty war coffers (Stole, 2012).

In November 1941, a joint committee of the Association of National Advertisers (ANA) and the Association of American Advertising Agencies (AAAA) brought to Hot Springs, Virginia, some 700 representatives from the advertising and media industries together with people from government and the business community to discuss national advertising and its role in the defense economy. Attendees were mostly concerned about Washington's attitude toward advertising ("Advertising Mobilizes Forces to Preserve Free Enterprise," 1941). Before any plans could be implemented, however, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor.

A few days after America's formal entry into the war, Donald M. Nelson, who was director of priorities for the Office of Price Management, contacted the organizers of the meeting, asking for advertisers' assistance in fighting the war. Nelson stressed the government's wish to be supported by the industry's creative talents and to have access to its channels of communication (Bethune, 1968, p. 34). For industry leaders, this was a golden opportunity to improve their relations with the government while also promoting the free enterprise system and advancing advertising's role within it. Publicly, however, they framed advertising's contribution as supporting the overall OWI effort, claiming that it was intended to serve "primarily as a public information service" ("War Comes to America," 1941). Moving at a breakneck pace, a handful of key figures, representing national advertisers, advertising agencies, and media, met on January 5, 1942, and unofficially formed the Advertising Council.

Upon establishing offices in Washington and New York, the Council issued an official announcement in March 1942, promising to "marshal the forces of advertising so that they may be of maximum aid in the successful prosecution of the war" (Advertising Council, 1942b). Careful consideration went into selecting representatives from small as well as large agencies, advertisers, mass media, and related groups. Of the Council's 31 officers, 10 were national advertisers. Advertising agencies were represented by 10 members. Three representatives were from the newspaper industry and two from national magazines. The radio, outdoor advertising, and retail industries were each represented by one person. National advertisers, agencies, and major media industries contributed a total of $100,000 toward the first year's operating budget ("Advertising Council Serves to Coordinate War Activities," 1942). Except for the executive director and a few staff members, the Council depended on volunteer labor and donated services (Advertising Council, 1942a).

The job of coordinating the government's publicity needs with the Council's offer of labor, space, and time fell to Ken Dyke, a former advertising manager for the Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Company, a past head of the ANA, and then working for the

National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC). As director of the OFF's Advertising Division, Dyke (1942) realized that many government officials were skeptical about advertising and was ready to show how their cooperation with the Advertising Council could benefit the war effort.

The Domestic Branch of the OWI consisted of seven smaller bureaus, responsible for disseminating the government's messages in various mass media, including news, radio, and motion pictures. Established in August 1942, its Bureau of Campaigns took charge of the central planning and control of all major governmental information programs. Until June 1942, when the OWI replaced the combined services of the OFF and the OGR and officially recognized the Ad Council as its major liaison with the advertising industry, the Council unofficially worked with the OFF's Advertising Division. Now, having established the Bureau of Campaigns, the OWI put the Council in charge of its promotional needs rather than create a government advertising department.

In addition to planning and timing government campaigns, the Council was responsible for coordinating communication between government agencies in need of promotional help and advertisers, agencies, and media that could provide such assistance (Stole, 2012). After analyzing and approving a particular campaign, the Bureau of Campaigns contacted the Advertising Council, whose executive committee determined whether it merited advertising support. Upon approval, one or more of the over 400 advertising agencies that had volunteered their services to the Council took responsibility for developing campaign plans in cooperation with a project director from the Council's paid staff and the government department that had requested the promotional help. Preliminary plans, usually copy suggestions, layouts, and miscellaneous material, were submitted to the Council's board for approval. Individual advertisers were then asked to incorporate campaign themes into their product advertisements free of charge.

At the end of 1942, the Council was actively involved in several major government campaigns. One focused on food, using promotional material to explain the government's agricultural goals and problems associated with the shortage of farm labor. Another provided information to the public about nutrition-related issues, including the importance of "victory gardens." A conservation campaign aimed at automobile owners promoted the importance of carpooling, tire preservation, efficient driving, and conservation of gasoline (tires and gasoline, of course, were rationed). A U.S. Treasury Department campaign urged everyone to invest at least 10% of their earnings in war bonds and stamps ("Advertisers Mustered for War Campaign," 1942). Much to the Council's delight, in 1943, the Treasury Department, which had been among the first departments to seek its promotional assistance, was so appreciative that it officially declared all advertising a tax-deductible expense (Stole, 2012).

Initially, the OWI enjoyed strong congressional support, but the loss of 45 Democratic seats in the 1942 midterm elections left Democrats with a narrow majority in the House of Representatives. This emboldened a Republican critique of the OWI, including new accusations that it was a propaganda tool for the president's Democratic agenda. In the spring and summer of 1943, Republican critics accused the Domestic Branch of being staffed by inexperienced and inept men, some of them draft dodgers. While vehemently denying the charges, Elmer Davis was unable to prevent the heated

debate over the government's information program that followed. When the dust finally settled a few months later, the OWI had undergone a major organizational shakeup. Many key officials resigned their positions, and drastic appropriations cuts forced a heavier reliance on assistance from private industry. Reflecting this change, the Advertising Council changed its name to the War Advertising Council, a name it kept until the war ended.

The close relationship between corporate America and Washington was made clear in the spring of 1944, when Roosevelt, in what would become a regular occurrence, invited 200 government officials and representatives from the advertising community to what the White House called "'off-the-record' indoctrination talks." Officials from the War Department, the Navy Department, and other executive departments and agencies were eager to chat with the delegates, who also got to meet with the president (Stole, 2012). Still, during the transition from peace to war, few questioned the increasing role of private industry in matters of government operations and affairs. That relationship would only strengthen in the postwar era.

Section 2: The Transition to a Postwar Propaganda Program, 1945–1946

None of the wartime information agencies were intended to last beyond the war. But in 1945, with peace within reach, government leaders realized the importance of continued dissemination of official information. The OWI's (1945) expectation was that the State Department's information service would continue this work, albeit "on a more limited scale" after war ended (p. 88). Importantly, however, this was a period when U.S. military intelligence, in cooperation with the State Department and, later, the CIA, helped bankroll academic research on persuasion techniques—activities that in all but name could be characterized as propaganda, but instead were termed "psychological warfare" (Simpson, 1994, p. 4) or "public diplomacy" (p. 13).

In the summer of 1945, OWI leaders met with State Department representatives to discuss creating a permanent U.S. information service for foreign relations under the State Department's direction ([untitled memo], 1945, p. 1). OWI leaders argued that "the adequacy with which the United States as a society is portrayed to the other peoples of the world" (MacMahon, 1945, p. xi) was important because to understand the United States, people in other countries needed to

> Understand the context of national tradition and character which is essential to the meaning of any statement. This is especially true of a collaborative foreign policy which by nature must be open and popular, understood and accepted at home and abroad.

The OWI stressed "international information activities" as "integral to the conduct of foreign policy." Thus, the objective behind a State Department program was:

> First, to see that the context of knowledge among other peoples about the United States is full and fair, not meager and distorted and, second, to see that the policies which

directly affect other peoples are presented abroad with enough detail as well as background to make them understandable.

OWI leaders acted quickly to secure a seamless transfer of the office's international functions to the new program, "setting up a non-partisan, very high-level commission to study the problem of exchange of information, press services, communication, cultural work, and other comparable subjects" ([untitled memo], 1945, p. 1). The State Department, which at this point had jurisdiction over only one information program, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, responded with "tremendous" interest "to the prospect of expanded responsibilities" (p. 2).

Even before the Second World War, American officials believed that Europeans had a "confused and inadequate notion" (OWI, 1945, p. 87) of the United States. Insufficient and distorted information, they argued, had created fertile ground for Axis propaganda, depicting America as "a country of gangsters and prostitutes, offensive wealth and grinding poverty, and a national moral[ity] characterized by both laxity and levity." Officials freely admitted that the entertainment industry bore much of the blame. Exaggerated movie depictions of crime and luxury had contributed to the image problem, as had American authors' tendency to dwell on decadence, frustration, and intellectual confusion. Although America's wartime contribution had improved its reputation, "the total impression of America in most foreign countries . . . still needs quite a good deal of correction."

Attempting to improve America's image, the OWI distributed literature, made public presentations, and created documentary films to present aspects of America that Hollywood ignored. Still, officials readily acknowledged that their efforts lacked the excitement of a Hollywood production (OWI, 1945, p. 88). Submitting a final report on the OWI's activities to President Truman in September 1945, Davis claimed that what the OWI called "the projection of America" (p. 86) had "told foreign peoples the truth; but it did not tell them the truth for their entertainment or edification. It told them the truth to advance the interests of the United States" (p. 92).

The Office of Information and Cultural Affairs

In August 1945, President Truman officially abolished the OWI and appointed William Benton as assistant secretary of state for public affairs. The latter wasted no time in refashioning the OWI's Foreign Branch into the OIC. During its first months of operations, the OIC relied on staff and appropriations left over from the OWI and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (U.S. Department of State, 1947a). Benton approached his mandate of conveying "a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government" (U.S. Department of State, 1945a, p. 5) with gusto. "We are one of the most powerful nations in the world today," he boasted. "A good many people in other countries think of us as the nation with the atom bomb, the B-29 planes, the huge navy and air forces. This impression is liable to give rise to misunderstanding, fear and hatred if we don't make our aims clear, and convince people that ours is a peaceful way of life" (p. 4). He argued that

"America, to most peoples abroad, is a symbol of prosperity" (p. 18); by becoming "a symbol of the best democratic traditions," America would help the world rid itself of "hatred, suspicion, and the germs of future wars." Acknowledging that "the word propaganda has bad connotations to many Americans," Benton promised to present "a well-rounded picture of America and American foreign policy . . . . We won't select or distort the facts to give a completely favorable picture. The best propaganda in the world is the truth. We found that out during the war" (p. 9).

Despite the State Department's assessment that the OWI's Foreign Branch had done "a credible public relations job" (Benton, 1947c, p. 2) during the war, a great deal of suspicion lingered. Accusations of untrustworthy and disloyal personnel, extravagance, and ineffectuality carried over to the OIC. A large segment of the press believed that continuation was unnecessary because sound foreign policy and actions speak for themselves.

To provide international audiences with the needed "full and fair picture," the OIC and related State Department groups developed eight programs (U.S. Department of State, 1947a, pp. 11–18). The Exchange of Persons Program continued a program created to facilitate international journalistic exchange, but with an added component. It was expanded to other exchange programs, including the Fulbright U.S. Student Program, established in 1946. The OIC served in a liaison capacity for private organizations engaged in international outreach, such as Kellogg, Ford, Guggenheim, and the Institute of International Education. It also aided foreign governments with programs that assisted foreign nationals with professional training in the United States and similar programs for Americans wanting to obtain such experiences abroad.

By 1946, the Library and Institutional Program had provided books, films, and periodicals to 85 libraries in 60 countries; it lent support to American-sponsored schools abroad and assisted with translations of American documents into foreign languages. The Mailed Information Service sent special material overseas, including newspaper clippings, while the Wireless Bulletin Service transmitted U.S. government news, including congressional hearings. The Photo and Filmstrip Service oversaw weekly shipments of photographs to be printed in overseas publications and provided educational films to educational institutions. Another program was responsible for collecting American newsreels and documentaries and translating them into foreign languages, and for publicizing *Amerika*, a bimonthly Russian-language magazine with a circulation of 50,000, which was distributed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and sold through commercial Russian channels and on the black market.

Countering accusations that it competed with private interests, the OIC did its utmost to assist American private enterprises; it vehemently denied that it was seeking to replace private press, radio, and motion picture organizations. It painted its task as filling in where "commercial or other limitations make it difficult for private concerns to carry on all necessary information work" (U.S. Department of State, 1947a, p. 7). To avoid accusations that it disseminated propaganda, the State Department stressed the importance of non-governmental cultural exchange. The government's job, Benton said, was "facilitative and supplementary . . . to avoid the taint of special pleading, but

to aim at better understanding of our democratic processes. We must support the free press and the radio in this objective" (pp. 8–9).

The OIC expressed strong faith in the role of commercial salesmen, advertisers, technicians, book publishers, play producers, universities, and even tourists in representing U.S. values abroad. It hoped that magazines like *Newsweek, Time*, and *Reader's Digest* would support the mission and expand into international markets (U.S. Department of State, 1945b, p. 26, 1947a, pp. 5–6). As far as possible, private organizations and individuals should take the lead in "informing foreign peoples" (U.S. Department of State, 1947a, p. 7) about the United States.

The OWI's Short-Wave Radio Program became an important aspect of the OIC's responsibilities, given that radio was essential in "giving foreign peoples a better understanding of American aims, policies and institutions" (U.S. Department of State, 1947a, p. 17). Benton (1946b) was particularly eager to get shortwave broadcasting adequately financed by either the press associations or domestic radio interests, although he acknowledged that "the commercial loss involved seems to pose an insuperable financial hurdle" (p. 6). The problem, from a private interest perspective, was that some areas were off limits for political reasons; others lacked the appropriate infrastructure to make it commercially profitable or practicable for American private agencies to operate (p. 5). Also, as Benton pointed out (p. 6), the dissemination of information to international audiences demanded specific skills. Merely translating news intended for an American audience would not suffice: the information needed to be expertly adapted for international comprehension.

Much like commercial broadcasters, movie and newsreel producers found it difficult to make a profit in international markets. So the State Department assisted in getting films produced and distributed, such as "Swedes in America," "Women in Medicine," "National Gallery of Art," "Home Life of an American Citizen," "American Methods of Education," "American Scientific Achievements," and "American Methods of Public Health." These were screened at U.S. embassies, schools, churches, clubs, and organizations across the globe and supplemented by comments and explanations by embassy employees (U.S. Department of State, 1945b). Benton thanked his personal friend Eric Johnston, the president of the Motion Picture Association of America, for convincing newsreel companies to donate "a very considerable sum of money" (p. 31) to help with the task. As the government yielded its role as soon as a private company was willing to take a chance on the international newsreel distribution, the newsreel industry had a financial stake in the development (p. 28).

Benton and the Mass Media

Unlike the media industries that willingly cooperated with the OIC, the two major U.S. newsgathering wire services, the Associated Press (AP) and United Press (UP), were not on board. While Benton (1946b) admitted that this was an "inconvenience" (p. 2), he took solace in knowing that Voice of America relied on AP and UP for only a fraction of its programming; their lack of cooperation were having less impact than initially anticipated. While supporting the State Department's information goal, the

president of the American Society of Newspaper Editors, James L. Knight, worried about the OIC's ability to deliver news objectively. With the war fresh in people's memory, he pointed to state domination of press and other communication facilities in 1930s Germany and Italy as extreme examples of what might happen if the line between government and the fourth estate were to be compromised (Benton, 1946b).

Acknowledging that the OIC might be viewed in some quarters as an "orthodox and potentially controversial peacetime operation" (Benton, 1947a, p. 2), Benton utilized a gentle but persistent approach to win the press's approval. This included extensive correspondence and a series of informal meetings with leading publishers and editors, including Arthur Sulzberger of the *The New York Times*, Helen Reid of the *Herald Tribune*, Eugene Mayer of the *Washington Post*, Harry Luce of *Time* and *Life*, Bruce Gould of Curtis Publishing, and Gardner and John Cowles, the owners of *Look* and several Des Moines and Minneapolis newspapers. Broadcasting presidents Niles Trammel of NBC and William Paley of the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) were likewise courted, as was Eric Johnston. These people were long-term acquaintances and in some cases close friends of Benton's. He also reached out to the American Society of News Editors, the New York Society of Newspaper Women, the National Press Club, the Inland Daily Press Association, and the Foreign Press Association and held several meetings with the Association of Radio Analysts (p. 3). Leading commentators, reporters, and columnists were contacted, and Benton sought advice from a newly created Radio Advisory Committee, consisting of prominent radio executives. John Hay Whitney, a wealthy motion picture investor, was asked to serve as a motion picture consultant (p. 4).

Although the OIC worked closely with American businesses and media interests, some critics on Capitol Hill and in the news media saw the OIC as a competitor to private industry. Benton (1946g, p. 6) insisted that the opposite was true: the OIC encouraged cooperation with private industry in every possible way; its role was to fill in any gaps. Benton was determined to strengthen the OIC's ties to business and to weaken remaining opposition in the press and the bureaucracy. Benton spent considerable time dealing with critics, including "a dozen exchanges" (p. 3) with Colonel McCormick, the conservative publisher of the *Chicago Tribune*, whom he never managed to convert into a supporter.

While visiting New York in the spring of 1946, Benton received enthusiastic support from members of over 100 organizations. Particularly valuable were endorsements from people with substantial international business and media experience, including C. D. Jackson, the managing director of Time-Life International, who had served as deputy chief of the OSS Psychological Warfare Division; and *Time* publisher Jim Linen, who had served as OWI chief in Italy. Senior *Newsweek* editor Ed Barrett also came out in support, as did Nelson Rockefeller, who offered to solicit members of Congress for endorsements. Many former members of the OWI and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs who had moved on to high-level jobs in the publishing and broadcasting fields expressed a similar willingness to assist (Benton, 1946e). Key members of the Council of Foreign Relations, a group that counted Benton among its members, declared themselves "unanimously behind the proposal"

(p. 2). Benton did not forget the movie industry. In March 1946, he attended the annual Academy Awards ceremony to drum up industry support for the OIC.

Even before the war officially ended, the State Department had collaborated with NBC on radio programs to explain U.S. foreign policy to American listeners (Dennis, 1945). Slightly worried that this agreement might suggest a network slant in the State Department's favor, NBC decided to balance the government's agenda with a range of political, legislative, and legal perspectives on U.S. foreign policy, while keeping a flexible format that allowed the State Department airtime access as needed. According to Sterling Fisher (1946), the assistant public service counselor at NBC, this would "create a balanced picture of our foreign policy and prevent the building up of a serious potential of criticism of us and the Department as doing a 'propaganda job'" (p. 2). Benton (1946d) asked him not to worry. In the 1940s, many Americans assumed that, unlike mass media in totalitarian countries, the U.S. media were free of direct government interference due to their commercial nature and the First Amendment to the Constitution. While advertisers might influence what was written and reported (or not), the government would never even consider meddling with the nation's press and broadcasting, if only out of fear of the outrage it would engender. Consequently, the State Department was able to disseminate its messages to the public quietly through the commercial mass media, without setting off a propaganda alarm.

After evaluating public opinion on international issues during the summer of 1946, and reasoning that private enterprise provided a safe harbor for accusations of state propaganda, Benton (1946d) stepped up the domestic radio campaigns by suggesting that the State Department approach all U.S. radio networks to request a "good evening time for a review of foreign affairs." The goal was to create a new type of programming that would inform the large prime-time audience about international issues that the State Department deemed important (Benton, 1946c).

ABC doubted the program had much listener appeal. But, Edward Murrow, then vice president in charge of public service for CBS, thought it smacked of government propaganda and was unafraid to say so. Reluctant to "give any government department a continuing block of time" (Carter, 1946), the Mutual Broadcasting System agreed with CBS about the propaganda problem. NBC's Francis Russell, who had opposed Benton's initial proposal, changed his opinion after discussing the matter with John Howe from the State Department, Yale professor and propaganda expert Harold Lasswell, and fellow public liaison Margaret Carter. In place of a regular weekly broadcast, Russell (1947) suggested that Benton appear "with greater frequency on established programs" (p. 1). In the summer of 1946, as the State Department prepared itself for a congressional battle over the OIC's funding and legal status, it needed all the help it could get.

Legislative Battle

Rep. Karl Mundt (R-SD) introduced legislation in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to make the OIC a permanent part of the State Department already in January 1945. Previously known as "a vociferous pre-Pearl Harbor isolationist" ("The

American Twang," 1947), Mundt initially believed that "Americans [should] spend more time 'minding our own business instead of . . . meddling in the governments of Europe.'" World War II changed his mind; the former schoolteacher turned congressman became a strong supporter of what was termed "internationalism" to build lasting world peace.

In addition to inheriting the OWI's mission, personnel, and remaining appropriations, the OIC inherited its predecessor's funding challenges. It immediately reduced the existing OWI payroll by more than one fourth (Benton, 1946f, p. 3). During the war, the Republican National Committee had actively attacked the OWI, and although some prominent Republicans, including Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR) and Rep. Everett Dirksen (R-IL), supported the government's information agency, most Republicans, and a few powerful Democrats, were opposed. According to former OWI director Elmer Davis, this had prevented the OWI from doing the best possible job:

> We were hired to fight Dr. Goebbels and his allies of the Japanese and Italian propaganda ministries, but for at least two or three months of every year, while our appropriations were going through the committees and the Houses of Congress, the head of the agency had to devote more time and energy to repelling the attack of our enemies at home than we were able to spend on Dr. Goebbels and our other enemies—who, of course, gleefully reproduced in their publications and broadcasts to the world the attacks made on OWI in Congress. (OWI, 1945, p. 95)

At the State Department's request, Mundt's bill was modified to include provisions for Voice of America. The revised bill (HR 4982) gave the State Department permission to operate globally (Shulman, 1990, p. 189). Introduced in the House Foreign Affairs Committee by the chairman, Rep. Sol Bloom (D-NY), the Bloom Bill elicited serious objections from conservative lawmakers concerned about the lack of oversight of the State Department's foreign activities. Some considered the program an underhanded move to revitalize the OWI and entrench the government in areas where it should have no role (Krugler, 2000, p. 65).

The end of the war had resurrected a long-standing battle between "internationalists" and "isolationists" in Congress. Eastern Republicans and many moderate and liberal New Dealers associated free trade and international expansion with world peace and American prosperity. Midwestern Republicans and several powerful Democrats wanted America to retreat to its prewar spheres (Lykins, 2003, p. 32). The congressional battle over HR 4982 and subsequent bills to make information services a permanent feature under the State Department's jurisdiction brought the geopolitical conflict to a head. In February 1946, the bill, which also proposed an expansion of the State Department's activities into China and Asia, went to the House Rules Committee. A hostile chairman, Rep. Eugene Cox (D-GA), warned Benton that 10 of the committee's 12 members opposed anything the State Department favored because of its "Communist infiltration and pro-Russian policy" (Ninkovich, 1981, p. 121). He accused the department of being "chock full of Reds." Nor did Cox respect the House Foreign Affairs Committee, characterizing it as "a worthless committee consisting

of worthless impotent Congressmen" (p. 122) and a "ghetto of the House of Representatives."

Benton (1946g) was incensed, warning that "radio stations and newspapers in many countries of the world are issuing half-truths, untruths or no truths about the people and the Government of the United States" (p. 2). Only "patient efforts" along the lines outlined by the State Department would dispel the misinformation. "There was a time when we could afford—or thought we could afford—to be unconcerned about what other people thought of us," he continued. "If the people of other nations misunderstood us it was regrettable. The passage of time would probably correct the error." But that was no longer the case. American decisions "will have repercussions affecting the lives of ordinary people all over the globe. Our attitude and our actions—and rumors thereof—will be matters of concern everywhere" (p. 2).

Benton (1946f) explained that the information program was not intended to indiscriminately build goodwill or to sell America abroad; nor did it compete with other countries' information programs. Rather, it helped other countries understand America and "join with us as willing friends and allies" (p. 5). This, he promised, would help U.S. trade and commerce, because "all our treaties, all our international organizations, all our material aid, [would] mean nothing without an accompanying knowledge, by other peoples, of the realities of the United States" (p. 6). Other nations needed facts to correct false impressions about the United States, and the OIC could supply them:

> Sometimes it is possible for a specific distortion to be created, either accidentally or deliberately, which will gain acceptance by repetition unless it is corrected. More often, however—and in this process Dr. Goebbels excelled—existing stereotypes or clichés about America are deepened and confirmed. These myths about America, which sometimes appear to be fostered deliberately for internal or external political reasons, are based on inadequate knowledge of the facts about American history and American institutions. (p. 8)

Arguing that the United States was not engaging in "psychological warfare or 'propaganda' as it is usually defined" (Benton, 1946i, p. 7), Benton asserted that it was not trying to "invade" other counties with ideas or "bomb" them with broadcasts. In the interest of promoting international understanding of the United States, Americans needed to "know about other people as much as other people need to know about us" (p. 7). The OIC's mission was to "explain the role of the United States in world affairs—its history, its national character and its faith in a free society" (p. 3). Benton (1946f) characterized the program as a "two-way project" between the United States and the participating foreign countries (p. 12) and a continuation of the cultural diplomacy program that Nelson Rockefeller had designed and implemented during the war as head of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs in Latin America.

Benton (1946i) was adamant that the OIC would facilitate peace, friendship, and international collaboration. Other nations viewed Americans as gangsters and cowboys, and believed that "Congress [was] weltering in a whirl of filibusters and cocktail parties" (Benton, 1946f, p. 8). America could ill afford to "stand as a mute giant before

the people of the world" (p. 13). Benton (1946a) quoted Jesus saying "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" but added:

> But during the ages since Jesus spoke the words, they have acquired a new and additional meaning . . . . In this new meaning . . . *free* refers to the liberation of men from tyranny, political shackles, social supersessions, economic slavery, and all institutions which limit their beliefs, dim their aspirations, or curb their love for their fellow human beings. (p. 2, emphasis in original)

Benton (1946f) accurately pointed out that the sum requested for the OIC's work was "about one-fifth of 1 percent of the budget proposed by the Army and Navy" (p. 2). Moreover, unlike the military, the State Department's work was preventive, an inexpensive insurance policy against future armed battles: "something we dare not do without." Desperate to keep the international information effort afloat, Benton was ready to fight. The OWI's annual budget had topped $66 million at the height of the war, but Benton was asking for only $19 million to operate the OIC during the 1947 fiscal year. An unsympathetic House Appropriations Committee reduced the sum to $10 million. The assistant secretary of state asked the Senate Appropriations Committee to reinstate $9 million. He warned that unless full funding could be granted, the government's international shortwave broadcasting might have to be discontinued, and several OIC programs would be cut.

Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee in May, Benton (1946g) acknowledged that $10 million was a lot of money. But he argued that $10 million was "hardly sufficient to operate a battleship for a year in wartime" (p. 3); it was a fraction of what many American corporations spent on advertising each year. Fortunately for Benton, the Senate committee was more appreciative of the OIC's mission than the House committee. It overruled the latter's decision, awarding the OIC the requested $19 million.

Closely related to the appropriations battle was the fight for official recognition of the OIC as outlined in the pending Bloom Bill. The State Department was excited when the House passed the bill in July 1946, but disappointment soon set in. The measure was blocked in the Senate by Senator Robert Taft (R-OH), a notorious isolationist. With no official authority, the State Department proceeded as best it could. The results, although often impressive, sometimes missed the mark. Failures supported the cause of critics who argued that government should stick to traditional foreign policy procedures and not engage in overseas propaganda. And while internationalism was a dominant force immediately after the Second World War ended, this changed after the 1946 midterm elections, when Republicans won both houses of Congress and several newly elected Republicans joined ranks with isolationist-leaning Midwest and Mountain members of Congress. The new coalition "increased its questioning of internationalism's cost and motives and heightened the concerns of those who saw world activism as the wisest course for America" (Lykins, 2003, p. 32).

Worried about the fate of its international information programs, the State Department diligently tried to obtain endorsements from American business, hoping

for their help in influencing “the average Congressman” (McKee, 1946) in ways that its own officials could not. As State officials knew well, large segments of the American business community viewed opposition to the OIC as an obstacle to their economic expansion and profits. The department’s solution was increased with reliance on private interests in furthering its internationalist agenda, at times seeking new and unorthodox solutions.

Section 3: Enter the Private Sector

With the efforts to establish a permanent government information program now stalled on the legislative front, Benton and the State Department turned to the private sector to continue their information work. By this time, numerous major business organizations, and to a lesser extent liberal foundations, were actively pursuing the work Benton championed. The State Department developed its program in conjunction with them, sometimes operating surreptitiously to keep its enemies on Capitol Hill in the dark. These groups were all created specifically by business interests to work with the government, and to push the government to embrace their agendas. The most important of these private sector organizations were the CED, the Export Advertising Association (EAA), and especially the Advertising Council. Between 1945 and 1947, two major campaigns came from these collaborations, yielding important lessons that would shape U.S. information work for decades.

The CED was founded in 1942 by a group of 18 leading industrialists and economic minds. It was formed and headed by Benton; Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker Corporation; and Marion B. Folsom, the treasurer of Eastman Kodak. Although the committee was launched at the outset of U.S. participation in the war, its purpose was to help policymakers map a postwar economy and world where business and American values would thrive. The CED referred to itself as an “entirely nonpolitical” group, although it clearly had a liberal corporatist bent (Lykins, 2003; Raucher, 1985; also Schriftgiesser, 1967; Whitham, 2013).

Unlike more conservative business groups, the CED sought to moderate, not destroy, the New Deal. It chastised the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) for not recognizing the federal government’s role in creating prosperity and rejected the idea that any “unshackling of free enterprise” would solve the nation’s reconversion challenges. The committee considered central planning, based on business principles and cooperation with the government, as the key to postwar growth and stability (Fones-Wolf, 1994). “We believe in the American system of free enterprise,” the CED proclaimed. “By that we do not mean that the government should let business alone, nor that economic opportunity should take precedence over political liberty, nor that the ‘good old days’ of the twenties should return” (Wartzman, 2017, p. 16).

In contrast to other business groups, including the NAM, the CED also held an accommodationist attitude toward organized labor (Fones-Wolf, 1994, p. 24).

The CED’s Research Division was Benton and Hoffman’s brainchild, created to establish a favorable environment for U.S. business and facilitate postwar expansion of private enterprise based on equanimity, albeit not equality, between corporations,

government, business, and labor interests (Fones-Wolf, 1994; Schriftgiesser, 1967). The group endorsed the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, believing that the overall level of economic activity was predicated on the total demand for goods and services and that the government had a large part to play in the process. It subscribed to the Roosevelt administration's view that a centrally organized economic policy would allow business growth and prosperity; that, in turn, would lift other groups in society (Schriftgiesser, 1967; Whitham, 2013).

A Research Committee, chaired by Vermont industrialist Ralph Flanders, provided the Research Division with research and other information (Hoffman, 1943, p. 7). In addition to Benton and Hoffman, it counted as members S. Bayard Colgate, chairman of the board of Colgate-Palmolive-Peet; Chester C. Davis, president of the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis; and William L. Batt, president of SKF. Batt had been vice president of the government's War Production Board, and Davis would soon head the War Food Administration. Other members included Donald David, the dean of Harvard's Graduate School of Business Administration; Max Epstein, chairman of the board of General American Transportation; Ernest Kanzler, president of Universal Credit; Thomas W. Lamont, chairman of the board of J. P. Morgan & Company; Beardsley Ruml, treasurer of the R. H. Macy Company; and Eric Johnston, then president of the Brown-Johnston Company and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (*A Report on the Activities of the Committee for Economic Development*, 1943, p. 23). By 1946, the committee's roster had changed, possibly to reflect a stronger emphasis on international issues. In addition to Benton, Davis, Dean, Flanders, Hoffman, Johnston, Kanzler, and Ruml, it included William C. Foster, vice president of the Pressed and Welded Steel Products Company; John Fennelly, a partner of Glore, Forgan, and Company; Marion B. Folsom; Harry Scherman, president of the Book of the Month Club; and R. Gordon Wasson, vice president at J. P. Morgan and Company (Benton, 1946h, pp. 1–2).

Concerned that its activities might be perceived as business propaganda, the CED also created a Research Advisory Board, chaired by Sumner H. Slichter, Lamont Professor of Economics at Harvard University. Other university professors joined Slichter in identifying issues in need of CED investigation, providing a scientific rationale for the choices (Hoffman, 1943).

Early on, one segment of the CED expressed great interest in encouraging free trade policies—that is, expanding overseas markets—to increase postwar employment. Initially, Benton and Hoffman were skeptical. While recognizing the importance of international involvement, they worried about the CED's lack of expertise in international matters; they believed the group would be more successful if it kept a domestic focus. Soon, however, Will Clayton, the architect of the international angle, had his colleagues convinced. Calvin B. Hoover, dean of Duke University's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, was asked to oversee a CED study on international postwar problems. Hoover, in turn, consulted business-friendly scholars and organizations and sought assistance from the Council on Foreign Relations, a public–private think tank that developed postwar foreign policy for the State Department (Whitham, 2013).

Several CED trustees joined U.S. government officials at the Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944. The goal of the conference, which was initiated by the U.S. and Great Britain, was to abolish economic nationalism and establish open markets for trade purposes. The meeting resulted in the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which provided loans to participating nations, as well as the World Bank, which worked closely with the IMF to provide financing, advice, and research to developing nations for economic "advancement." The goal behind the economic stabilization was to make these countries into trading partners. Foreign markets boded well for America's postwar prosperity. Hoffman, now a strong advocate of the international approach, urged the United States to extend loans and possibly cancel foreign debts. Believing that world peace and prosperity depended on an expanded international role for U.S. business, Hoffman stated that the U.S. harbored no desire to use its economic power for political purposes, including imposing capitalism on other nations against their wishes (Raucher, 1985).

Increasing numbers of Washington leaders shared Hoffman's internationalist views, but some, including most members of the banking community, were reluctant. They worried that the IMF might misuse its power and resources, especially if its mission to lower tariffs undermined some U.S. interests overseas. Anticipating a tough ratification battle in Congress, the Democratic administration asked the CED, the business group best aligned with its economic agenda, for assistance. This was strategic. The CED was respected in business circles. It counted several well-known Republicans, including Hoffman, among its leaders and maintained a conciliatory attitude toward organized labor. The CED, in other words, was not seen as dogmatic, and its endorsement of the Bretton Woods agreement was instrumental in the measure's passage through Congress (Raucher, 1985; Whitham, 2013).

Much like the CED, the Advertising Council was intended to be a temporary wartime organization but talks about a postwar continuation started a year before the war ended. A key factor in this decision was that the Council had proven to be a public relations triumph for the often-controversial advertising industry, entrenching it as a positive force among the general public and at the highest levels of government. There was no reason to abandon what had been gained. By September 1944, a Post-War Planning Committee, headed by Council chairman Chester LaRoche, reflected a new set of ambitious plans for educating people toward a better understanding of the interdependence of business and government (Stole, 2012, pp. 153–154). Much like the CED, it recognized that postwar reconstruction might lead to a host of social and economic disturbances that threatened private enterprise.

The Council stressed that "*sound* government and *sound* business" were prerequisites for a "high standard of living," "cultural advantages," and "lasting social gains" (War Advertising Council, n.d., p. 4). The Council claimed a demonstrated ability to cope with national information problems, thus making it the best-equipped organization to continue these activities after the war by helping "the best and most liberal elements of business, to work hand-in-hand with labor and Government" ("Asks Ad Council Aid to Win the Peace," 1944). President Roosevelt (1944) approved, considering it "vitally important that the working partnership between business

and government, which has so successfully brought information to people in wartime, continue into the post-war period." When Harry Truman (1945) assumed the presidency a few months later, he echoed these sentiments.

Most industry leaders supported a postwar Advertising Council. They lauded it for creating better understanding between the government and the business community and easing the hostility between the two groups. The Council's decision to select Washington as its permanent headquarters reflected a desire to continue this work. The move also allowed for more effective handling of legislative issues before Congress and demonstrated the Council's role as a rising political player. At the same time, keenly aware that the organization would lose its legitimacy and public relations value if Americans viewed it as a tool for special interests, Council leaders expressed a desire to focus on public service and studiously avoid controversy (War Advertising Council, n.d.).

The Peace Campaign

As World War II was nearing an end, world leaders went to Dumbarton Oaks, Washington, D.C., and Yalta to discuss the most ambitious of all postwar plans: preventing another world war. At these conferences, organizers assembled the framework for the United Nations, an international organization to succeed the League of Nations. Worried that isolationist conservative lawmakers might interfere, the State Department approached the Advertising Council in January 1945 with a request for a campaign to build support for "international cooperation" (Lykins, 2003, p. 33).

The department's request put the Council in uncharted territory. As a nonprofit tax-exempt organization, its by-laws prohibited political work, including lobbying Congress. Similarly, while government agencies during the war could solicit the Council's assistance in educating the public and disseminating information, it was understood that using the organization for propaganda purposes would evoke sharp criticism from political opponents, who had already accused the OWI of being a propaganda tool for Roosevelt. Advertisers who had cooperated with the Council's campaigns had done so with little risk of political backlash. Appeals to Americans to buy war bonds, donate blood, and avoid wasteful practices were noncontroversial and had enjoyed bipartisan support (Stole, 2012). Now, only a few months later, the Council was faced with a controversial request. The problem was not that international cooperation lacked popular backing—polls showed strong public support for the United Nations—but that involvement in such a campaign, which undoubtedly was an effort to influence the public on a political level, might be poorly received by "a considerable portion" of large newspapers (Repplier, 1945, p. 4) and result in bad publicity for the advertisers.

In exchange for granting tax-deductible status to advertising in 1943, the Treasury Department had imposed a set of strict rules. While "coordinating the forces of advertising so that they may be of maximum aid in public service" (Larney, 1948, p. 1), the Council could not let any of its net earnings benefit private shareholders or individuals. In addition, "no substantial part" of its activities could be "engaged for carrying on

propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation." After careful soul-searching, however, the Council decided that a "proper campaign of information" (Repplier, 1945, p. 4) to secure peace and prosperity outweighed any possible concerns, and reassured itself that it was doing what any organization serving in the public interest ought to do. In an unprecedented move, it assured individual advertisers that no one would be expected to donate advertising space to the new campaign if they thought it might hurt their goodwill (p. 5).

In the spring of 1945, with the inaugural United Nations conference in San Francisco only a few months away, the stage was set for a campaign focused on "the need for an international organization to maintain the peace" (Lykins, 2003, p. 34). The idea originally came from former OFF director Archibald MacLeish. In his new capacity as assistant secretary of state for public affairs, MacLeish emphasized that the campaign was not intended to specifically promote the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta plans, but rather to promote international cooperation. MacLeish found a strong supporter in James Webb Young, chairman of the Advertising Council's Board of Directors, a senior executive at the J. Walter Thompson Advertising Agency who had served as director of the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce before joining Nelson Rockefeller in the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (Ganly, 1945, p. 86). Council leaders assured themselves that "peace" was "a timely expansion of the far-flung home front information job" (Robinson, 1945) that American business had performed during the war. In addition to the political benefits for the advertising industry, the issue had wide ideological support among the Council's executive leadership (War Advertising Council, 1945b).

The Council proceeded on the premise that international cooperation was a nonpartisan issue that, according to public opinion polls, was supported in principle by both major political parties, by both houses of Congress, and by more than 90% of the American people ("Council Will Aid Campaign on U.S. Role for Peace," 1945, p. 86). Still, depending on the source, between 20 and 30 U.S. senators were planning to vote against the proposal, making its passage a potential problem (Repplier, 1945, p. 3). Campaign messages encouraged Americans to stay informed about international cooperation and to participate in group discussions on the topic and to contact the press and their congressional representatives to express their views. Council executives made careful use of experts in the field of foreign relations, including officials from the State Department and non-government organizations that studied international problems. They consulted journalists, economists, and business leaders (War Advertising Council, 1945a, 1946).

Fearing that a connection with the campaign might evoke unwanted suspicion, the State Department, which by now was facing its own set of attacks from said "isolationists," requested that its role be kept hidden. The Council granted the request, which was yet another departure from established practice of publicly identifying any government agency that requested campaign assistance (Lykins, 2003, p. 35). In exchange for the advertising community's cooperation, the State Department promised to "employ all available information facilities" so that advertising professionals could "turn the United States into one vast town meeting devoted to learning the facts on Dumbarton Oaks" ("West Explains Job War Council Can Do Postwar," 1945, p. 13).

Great care was taken in writing and designing the actual advertisements. The Compton Advertising Company volunteered to be in charge. Compton's instructions from the Advertising Council were to highlight international cooperation as a positive development. Ad copy should frame membership in the United Nations as "an opportunity" rather than "a frightening but necessary chore" (Advertising Council, 1945a, p. 2). Phrases such as "architects of the future" and "blueprinting the peace" were encouraged, as were mentions of "America's obligation to help engineer the peace." It was also important that the ads strike an appropriately "virile" tone to help counteract the "feminine," even "sissy," image of the peace dove, which some campaign advisors found problematic (pp. 1–2):

> The Council's internationalist campaign promoted America's entry into the United Nations with warnings of the dire consequences of again rejecting world cooperation. Campaign copy . . . warned that victory would not end the possibility of another war and that the next conflict might destroy the nation . . . . [It] promoted American membership as a way to foster peace, freedom, and American prosperity while presenting withdrawal as increasing the dangers to the nation because of postwar economic, political, and military realities. (Lykins, 2003, p. 34)

Still, the Council insisted on referring to the "Peace" campaign as a project that "did not intend to assume the role of advocate . . . for any specific world organization plan" (War Advertising Council, 1945b, p. 2). International cooperation, it said, "was simply an extension of peaceful community living"; lasting peace required people across nations to make a "concerted effort" to trust and understand each other. Or as one campaign slogan stated, "Work Today for Peace So Your Children May Live Tomorrow" ("Advertising News and Notes," 1945a).

Soon some of the larger newspapers started pushing back. Calling for postwar American retrenchment, they claimed that public support for the United Nations was in decline. Worried that controversy-adverse advertisers would be reluctant to sponsor the campaign, the Council altered the sponsorship procedure. Instead of asking advertisers to provide support through their own advertising, as before, it produced public service ads and material specifically for the campaign and invited groups and organizations to be supporters (OWI, n.d.).

Compared with the wartime campaigns, which had enjoyed massive advertiser support, the "Peace" campaign was not a great success. Nevertheless, it illustrates the shared interests and symbiotic relationship that had developed between business and government. It also illustrates the State Department's willingness to use the Advertising Council as a smokescreen for its domestic propaganda and Council executives' willingness to risk the organization's nonprofit status, and maybe even its future. The United Nations Charter was approved by Congress on July 28, 1945.

Postwar Developments

In contrast to "obstructionist" elements in Congress, commercial interests immediately expressed appreciation for the State Department's commitment to expanding free

trade. One business association determined to work with government officials was the EAA, which had been established in 1938 and counted manufacturers, domestic and foreign publishers, advertising agencies, and radio representatives among its members. Its purpose was to "promote the 'critical role and benefits of advertising' and its role in indirectly financing affordable free press in an open society" ("International Advertising Association," 2019). The EAA promoted itself as a "cross-section of the export of American ideas and products" (Powers, 1946), and claimed to base its overseas contacts on "mutual respect and understanding . . . regardless of color, creed, religion, or nationality." In many ways, as the organization itself pointed out, its efforts were all but identical to the State Department's information program. The EAA's energy and enthusiasm were sorely needed because Americans were grossly uninformed on issues related to international trade. In 1944, for example, only 63% of poll respondents could correctly define "tariff"; only 10% were familiar with America's trade agreements plan (Foster, 1983, p. 94). Grateful for the EAA's offer of support, OIC Deputy Director Charles M. Hulten (1946) urged other business groups to follow suit and tell the story of American leadership abroad.

The CED had originally planned to dissolve after the war, but many members now worried that overseas matters would be ignored as the nation focused on postwar reconversion. Thus, the postwar edition of the Research Division set its sights on international economic problems, especially the expansion of trade. Still, due to internal debates over international engagement, only one of the 13 reports published by the CED between 1945 and 1948 dealt with this issue (Whitham, 2013, pp. 866–867).

Around the same time, the Council made the decision to continue operations permanently, the OWI was dissolved. While the Foreign Branch would become the basis of the OIC, there were no plans for continuing the Domestic Branch. Testifying before the Senate Appropriations Committee in June 1945, representatives from the Advertising Council (1945f) urged that the Domestic Branch be continued so that its relationship with the government could be extended into the reconversion period, keeping "a central information organization" afloat. It promised the government that an allocation of less than $1.3 million would be matched with $300 million from advertisers and the commercial mass media for "dramatizing and simplifying" messages to the "average citizen" after the war had ended. The problem with this proposal was that a government-subsidized information program during peacetime might well be construed as domestic propaganda. The government recognized a need to communicate with the American public, however; a reorganization of the Advertising Council presented itself as the perfect solution.

In October 1945, the Council pledged to spend at least $30 million annually "to help create public understanding of important national problems" ("War Ad Council Launches Peacetime Service Plan"). The reorganization included a plan to attract more sponsoring members and to create a new category for "contributing members" willing to donate $10,000 toward the Council's operating expenses. Seven organizations—the ANA, the AAAA, the American Newspaper Publishers Association and its Bureau of Advertising, the National Association of Broadcasters, the National Publishers Association, the Outdoor Advertising Association of America, and the Point of

Purchase Advertising Institute—immediately stepped forward as sponsors; 27 others signed on as contributing members ("Ad Council Maps $30,000,000 Public Service Program," 1945; "Advertising News and Notes," 1945c; Advertising Council, 1945e).

The Council was keenly aware that public issues tended to attract more controversy in times of peace. Thus, to come across as serving "truly in the public interest" ("War Ad Council Launches Peacetime Service Plan," 1945) required checks and balances. The Council pledged to focus on issues "of general public interest and not solely in the interest of one group." Future campaigns needed to be based on "an act of Congress requiring public understanding or action; or problems certified in the public interest by three-quarters of an advisory committee" consisting of "outstanding leaders in business, labor, farming, education, religion, Government and journalism" ("Advertising News and Notes," 1945b). Chaired by Evans Clark, the executive director of the Twentieth Century Fund, the committee consisted of carefully selected "leaders of public opinion" drawn from diverse fields of American society, including Paul Hoffman, Studebaker's president; George Gallup, director of the American Institute of Public Opinion; Alan Gregg, director of medical science at the Rockefeller Foundation; and several business, education, religion, and labor leaders ("Public Advisory Group Will Aid Ad Council," 1946).

To serve as a "unifying force" between business and government, the Advertising Council also established an Industrial Advisory Committee chaired by GE president Charles E. Wilson. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence of Wilson, a true heavyweight in the pantheon of American capitalism. In 1950, he left GE for 2 years to run the government's newly created Office of Defense Mobilization, which oversaw the economy during the Korean War. The Council's original Board of Directors, which was still in existence, could only approve short-term or emergency campaigns requested by the government. In contrast, the Industrial Advisory Committee helped define what served the "public interest," and could influence the Council's politically charged long-term campaigns.

The Ad Council was now taking on policy matters of special importance to those who would shape the course of the nation and the world over the coming decades. Its new status was underscored in September 1946 when, for the second time that year, the organization teamed up with the Office of War Management and Reconversion to co-sponsor a two-day conference at the White House devoted to a review of national and international problems that required "public understanding." Some issues coincided with campaigns the Council was already working on; others were ideas for future efforts. Council members were able to interact with some 90 business executives, representing a wide range of industries and all advertising media, and to ask government officials any questions they wished (Stone, 1948, p. 1; also *Conference—The White House*, 1946; Small, 1946; Steelman, 1946). As director and president of the Mutual Broadcasting System Edgar Kobak (1949) later commented, "men in industry forget that the men in government are just ordinary folks—and vice versa. Rubbing elbows, exchanging ideas help to clear the air."

In 1944, Hoffman had sought assistance from the Council's Board of Directors in promoting the CED's plans for postwar tax revisions to "stimulate enterprise and

employment" (Advertising Council, 1944, p. 1). While many board members appreciated the CED's importance, they also worried that a campaign along those lines was beyond the Council's scope. Undaunted, the CED had returned a few months later with another request, asking for the Council's assistance on a handbook for advertising and sales managers to "encourage advertising planning designed to create and expand demand for goods" (Advertising Council, 1945d, p. 1). While sympathetic to the CED's objectives, the Council again turned down the request. America was still at war, and the Council was determined to focus on "war themes." But now, the reorganized Council was not bound by the same considerations. With the Industrial Advisory Committee serving as a convenient buffer, the Council was able to accept campaigns to "educate" Americans on economic issues, including the importance of international trade and expansion, without attracting negative attention ("War Ad Council Launches Peacetime Service Plan," 1945; also "Advertising News and Notes," 1945b). Responding to concerns that the postwar Council might be accused of disseminating propaganda, LaRoche was quick to point out that "propaganda exists only when its source is unknown" (Advertising Council, 1945c, p. 1).

World Trade

While the administration and its supporters in the corporate community realized the OIC's importance in the overall quest for international expansion, most citizens paid little attention. The task of educating the public on the importance of world trade, and trying to influence Congress's vote on OIC appropriations, fell to the business community. One of the first groups to volunteer for this task was the Subcommittee on World Trade Education. Established by the Commerce Department's Advisory Committee on International Economic Policy, the Subcommittee was dominated by business executives from companies with extensive international interests and foundation heads with global portfolios. In addition to the chair, Charles Symington, who was chairman of the board of the Symington-Gould Corporation, members included Alger Hiss, president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP); Shepard Morgan, also from CEIP; Blackwell Smith from the Far East–America Council of Commerce and Industry; Theodore Smith from the Motion Picture Association of America; CED leader Arthur W. Page, the vice president and director of AT&T, who was sometimes referred to as "the father of corporate public relations"; and C. D. Jackson, the managing editor at Time-Life International. The subcommittee took on the task of informing and exciting Americans about "World Trade and Travel," as the campaign would be officially known. Clark assumed the administrative role and offered a set of "extensive studies of the foreign economic relations" (World Trade Foundation, 1947, pp. 2–3) conducted by the Twentieth Century Fund to assist the subcommittee.

The Twentieth Century Fund coordinated a series of educational films and newsreels produced in cooperation with The World Today, a newsreel company. A two-reel short titled *Round Trip: The U.S.A. in World Trade* explained the benefits of world trade and its effects on the country (Clark, 1947a). John Grierson, a well-known

filmmaker and director of mass communications at UNESCO, added to the effort by creating a documentary film on two-way international trade (Symington, 1947e). Not one to miss a chance for publicity, Charles Symington wanted to use the film to dramatize events during the upcoming World Trade Week and pushed for its screening at the White House for the President and a "carefully selected group of government officials" to create media buzz. Not to be outdone, Encyclopedia Britannica Films, a company with close connections to Benton, produced two short films, *Building America's Houses* and *Distributing America's Goods* (Clark, 1947a).

Clark worked closely with Eric Johnston, in the latter's capacity as president of the Motion Picture Association of America, to create a set of newsreels on "World Trade" and "World Travel," to be screened before feature films in theaters across the country (World Trade Foundation, 1947, p. 5). Although movie attendance had declined from its wartime peak, documentary "shorts" were still regarded as an effective way to reach the large segment of the population who saw movies on a weekly basis. According to Symington (1947f), the "World Trade and Travel" project was "the only sound method of developing an orderly world," "the most constructive and practical means of stabilizing and expanding our domestic economy," and was vital for promoting and preserving conditions that were "essential for world peace."

Newsreels could reach only so far, however. In the fall of 1946, the subcommittee reached out to the Advertising Council about a possible collaboration. In his role as Public Policy Committee chairman, Clark recommended that the campaign get top priority in 1947 (World Trade Foundation, 1947, p. 2). Once again Ted Compton of Compton Advertising agreed to develop advertising mats, suggestions, and slogans that individual advertisers could incorporate into their promotional material. Following the subcommittee's recommendation, however, and taking some hard-earned lessons into consideration, Compton carefully avoided anything that might be interpreted as endorsing specific policies or legislation. He took a page from the OIC in insisting that such advertising materials follow a "purely educational" (C. D. Jackson, 1947, p. 1) approach as they invited the public to recognize the free flow of imports and exports as essential to "lasting peace and prosperity." The difficult task of overseeing campaign policies and coordinating the relationship with the Advertising Council fell to Jackson (Symington, 1947c). The subject matter was complex and far more abstract than most of the issues the Council had featured during the war. Organizers also realized that individual advertisers, who now had plenty to sell, preferred to use their advertising space to promote products and services instead of sharing it with Council messages (Cloyes, 1947).

Part of the war bond and salvage campaigns' success had been their appeal to tangible tasks that average Americans could comply with. The concern surrounding the "World Trade and Travel" campaign was that it would not evoke the same kind of emotional response (C. D. Jackson, 1947). General Motors CEO Alfred Sloan, on whom the Council was leaning for support, was increasingly dubious. While harboring no doubt about the effort's educational value, he worried about its ability to attract the public's interest at a time when a host of reconversion issues were competing for their attention (Sloan, 1947). This "non-controversial" campaign, according to the

Advertising Council (1945b), "focused on perhaps the least understood economic fact of our time," and as Council executives had reminded themselves a couple of years prior, the United States had "embarked on a new, significant, and far reaching course of internationalism" and needed a business liaison, a role that the Council was most suited, and very eager, to fill.

By June 1947, organizers had raised enough funds. The campaign, with copy suggestions intended to persuade individual advertisers to participate and appeal to the average consumer, was up and running (Cloyes, 1947; C. D. Jackson, 1947). The trade publication *Tide* ("What the Council Is Doing," 1947) characterized Compton's campaign guide as a "copiously illustrated" 20-page folder that demonstrated the importance of world trade to U.S. security and prosperity. It presented eight sample advertisements, all stressing one theme: "Part of Every Dollar You Get Comes from World Trade." One newspaper ad depicted a druggist combining medication ingredients under the headline "The United Nations meet every time I mix a prescription!" (Cloyes, 1947, p. 3). The text explained that raw material from 102 countries was needed to fulfill Americans' medicine needs. Payment for these products put money in the hands of workers and farmers in India, China, and Italy, letting them buy machines, food, radios, and cars from the United States. This resulted in more jobs for U.S. workers and increased American prosperity. "We're trying 'to win the peace,'" read the copy. "When you do business with folks you can't afford to get mad at them and they can't afford to be bad friends with you" (p. 30).

Ten thousand copies of the guide were distributed to advertising agencies and advertisers by organizations including the ANA, the AAAA, and the National Publishers Association to "inform the American public of a few facts concerning international commerce and its effects on the daily lives of the average citizen" ("News and Notes in the Advertising Field," 1947). The Compton agency also offered copy suggestions to encourage international travel and tempted advertisers with copy and slogans for advertisements, billboards, window posters, car cards, and radio commercials (Cloyes, 1947). That aspect of the campaign was clearly directed at the relative few who could afford travel. Still, the campaign organizers, who probably were in that category, insisted that foreign travel be considered a form of foreign aid: it used the market and private spending to spread capital around a war-ravaged world. Dollars spent abroad by American tourists, the argument went, would in time trickle back into U.S. coffers through purchases of export products including Hollywood film rights (Popp, 2012, p. 2). "World trade is one of the most important and least understood problems that this country faces today," asserted Undersecretary of State William Clayton (Cloyes, 1947, p. 31). Not only were Americans in need of a national awakening regarding the need for expanded, well-balanced world trade, they would "have to accept the interdependence of all nations just as they now accept the interdependence of all our States."

Despite the organizers' enthusiasm and insistence on the purely educational nature of the "World Trade and Travel" campaign, political opponents, especially the "isolationists" who had criticized the "Peace" campaign, began to ask questions. They claimed that the effort was just another push by the Truman administration for

international treaties and foreign dependence, a thinly veiled propaganda effort by the Democratic administration to influence legislation. Not only did accusations like these put Washington in a bad light, they also discouraged potential sponsors, including the Carnegie Corporation, from getting involved. Clark (1947b) rebutted the accusations, stressing that the Council's advertising material was strictly confined to "the diffusion of knowledge and understanding"; and its purpose was not to tell anybody "what to do or how to do it."

Meanwhile, the subcommittee's ongoing fundraising struggle was magnified by the futile attempts to obtain support from foundations and industries, including an unsuccessful effort to have Alfred Sloan approach the Automobile Manufacturers Association for a $100,000 "sponsoring member" contribution (Symington, 1947a, 1947b). This situation became even more pronounced after Secretary of State George Marshall presented his plans for a European Recovery Program (ERP). Commonly referred to as the Marshall Plan, it outlined an elaborate government strategy for American "investment" in the war-torn and economically devastated countries of Western Europe, so that they could become loyal U.S. trading partners.

The "World Trade and Travel" campaign was reaching a crossroad. In a July 1947 letter, the chairman of the board of Chase National Bank, Winthrop Aldrich (1947), told Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder that the Subcommittee on World Trade Education had outlived its usefulness. World trade should no longer be the focus, Aldrich argued. Instead, the emphasis should be on the Marshall Plan. Symington (1947d) agreed. Despite the organization's best efforts, the quest to secure funding for newsreels and documentary films and to lend support to the Advertising Council had taken a toll. The subcommittee could no longer carry on. The Council, however, was battle-tested and ready for the Marshall Plan campaign.

Section 4: The Russians Are Coming!

If there is a single factor that weakened and eventually eliminated the opposition to a large and permanent international information program within the State Department, it was the emergence of the Soviet threat and the fear of global communist domination. In the 2 years following the war, the Soviet Union had been viewed warily by the United States, but it still had the reputation of an ally that had sacrificed over 20 million lives in stopping the Nazi conquest of Europe. The immediate concern in Western Europe was less the threat of Soviet military invasion than the popularity of left-wing political parties, to some extent because the political left had invariably led the battles against Nazi occupation. But by 1947, the growing perception of a Soviet threat, combined with the powerful support by business for Benton's project, tipped the scales.

By early 1947, the concern about the Soviet Union's challenge to U.S. world dominance intensified. When Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall replaced James Byrnes as secretary of state, he promised a much firmer stance toward Russia ("Resignation of Sec. Byrnes," 1947). Interviewed on NBC's *University of the Air*, Benton (1947e) complained that other nations still viewed Americans as "imperialistic, un-democratic, militaristic and reactionary, and culturally backward." According

to Benton, this concern was shared by Marshall, who he said was "more puzzled about how to meet the propaganda about us abroad than any single problem in our international relations."

Responding in a letter to Benton, Marshall (1947a) attributed his focus on such disinformation to "Soviet psychological warfare against the U.S.," but he warned against counterpropaganda to even the score. Propaganda, in Marshall's view, contradicted "generally accepted precepts of democracy," and its use by the United States would play "directly into the hands of the Soviets," whom he considered "masters in the use of such techniques." In its stead, the overseas information program should present "nothing but the truth, in a completely factual and unbiased manner." While results might be slow in coming, this approach would help the United States "establish a reputation before the world for integrity of action." Marshall recommended expanding the State Department's program to include Hungary, Romania, Poland, and other countries where communist influence was rising. He noted a "much more fertile and malleable field" for American ideas in countries where "outside pressure" was causing communism to be "thrust upon the people against their will."

A decade earlier, Hollywood and German propaganda had been blamed for what the State Department characterized as "misconceptions" overseas about America. Now the culprit was the Soviet Union. America's courageous wartime ally was becoming a diabolical foe, hell-bent on world domination, and unscrupulous in achieving its goals. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce magazine *Nation's Business* helped fan the flames by reporting that Russians were spreading false rumors about Americans and portraying them as politically ignorant and lacking in knowledge about domestic and world affairs. Russia, according to *Nation's Business*, was claiming that "publication of most newspapers in the United States has become a branch of capitalist economy" and that "editors and correspondents are financially dependent and feed public opinion in accordance with their masters' directives" (Wood, 1947, p. 71). Russians had been brainwashed into believing that throughout the United States, veterans were out of work, sick workers had no safety net and lacked free medical care, and gender inequality and oppression of blacks were major problems, such that "the average American's faith in his economic system is thoroughly shaken." The publication also warned that the Russians were spreading rumors about American soldiers "murdering workers in South Korea, and blowing cholera germs across the border" to kill North Koreans (p. 37). Moreover, they were spreading the same anti-American propaganda to other countries, including China. The social research organization Mass Observation, a credible barometer of public opinion in Great Britain, confirmed these concerns, noting that anti-American attitudes had proliferated in England—a claim that *Newsweek* confirmed ("Does Britain Like Us?" 1947).

The tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union escalated in 1947 and exploded in 1948. In the immediate postwar period, communists won unprecedented victories in every Scandinavian country and support for communism in Italy and France was surging. In 1946, Greece entered a civil war over communist rule. By March 1947, Truman called for financial assistance to Turkey and Greece to prevent them from falling under the Soviet Union's influence. Public opinion reflected the

Cold War sentiments. In early 1947, more than 60% of Americans expressed "distrust" in the Soviet Union; only 25% trusted Russians to cooperate with the United States (Foster, 1983, pp. 55–56).

The growing recognition of anti-American sentiments provided increased support for a permanent and adequately funded overseas information program. In March 1947, Rep. Mundt introduced a bill, which was cosponsored in the Senate by H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), to give the State Department authority over the dissemination of information abroad; it established the OIC as the agency in charge of this mission (Mansfield, 1947, p. A2365). Key members of Truman's administration, including Secretary of State Marshall, Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Commerce W. Averell Harriman (formerly ambassador to Russia), and Ambassador to Russia Walter Bedell Smith, supported the bill (Cull, 2008, p. 36).

Having fought long and hard for the OIC, Benton was delighted to be supported in this effort by his CED colleague Paul Hoffman (1947). In a letter, Hoffman urged Senator William E. Jenner (R-IN) to give "favorable consideration to the appropriation requested by the State Department for their information activities":

> As a result of personal observations in many foreign countries and from reliable reports from our own travelers, as well as others, I am convinced that one of the major tasks that lie ahead of us is that of correcting the utterly fantastic notions held by most foreigners about our American way of life. Those mistaken ideas will not be corrected by diplomats or by sending money abroad, or through any formal expression of good will. Only by getting solid, factual information about America before foreign peoples can we hope for understanding and friendship. (Hoffman, 1947)

As Senator Wayne Morse (R-OR) warned, however, U.S. insistence that its "information" was free of ulterior motives enjoyed limited credence abroad. Other countries were fully aware that the United States had suffered fewer human and financial losses than many other countries during the Second World War. He regarded the criticism as something to consider (Benton, 1947e). Some believed the OIC would stand a better chance of congressional approval if the highly visible Benton were removed from his position. Not only did his approach defy traditional forms of diplomacy, but many members of Congress found his "super-salesmanship" off-putting. This did not sit well with Benton's CED colleagues, who argued that the attack on Benton was "the kind of thing that kept responsible and able people from going into Government work" ("The American Twang," 1947). Believing that Benton brought unique, and highly desirable, qualities to his position as assistant secretary of public affairs, they challenged critics to find a better-qualified person for the job.

Carroll Rheinstrom, the president of McFadden Publications and one of Benton's closest allies, viewed his advertising background as a major asset. Advertising experts knew how to sell. The same people who "had made millions of people ask for a specific brand of breakfast food" (Rheinstrom, 1947b, p. 3) could now use their skills for political purposes. Thus, the State Department was lucky to have a successful

advertising executive as assistant secretary of state. Not only did Benton have "the highest qualifications for directing such a sales program for the American ideal, abroad," his program extended far beyond textbook theory "because of his experience in handling hundreds of millions of dollars through private enterprise, under conditions where private enterprise insisted that such sums be expended with profitable results."

Benton (1947b) constantly repeated that the OIC operated only in "those areas and media not adequately covered by private agencies" (p. 5), and that the State Department coordinated its work with private actors to the extent possible. The Exchange of Persons Program, for example, operated almost entirely through private agencies. As of mid-1947, only about 300 of the 17,000 international students covered by the program were subsidized by the department, and 20 private organizations had paid to send two shiploads of American exchange students to Europe. NBC and CBS provided nearly half of the content for the OIC's International Broadcasting Division. Of the films distributed by the International Motion Picture Division, 70% were privately produced; the rest were made on contract with private companies. Other divisions took similar care, and Benton requested that the news and broadcasting industries form committees to monitor the OIC's handling of news and information.

Benton (1947a) accepted Rheinstrom's offer to contact the CED's Board of Directors and friendly journalists with a request for help and asked him to forward a copy of the letter to the Chamber of Commerce, where a subcommittee was working on a resolution to endorse the OIC program. Privately, Rheinstrom's McFadden Publishing had launched an overseas program to amplify the State Department's information program. Responsible for 15 foreign magazine editions with sales of 21 million copies each year, Rheinstrom (1947b) obviously hoped for a profitable return, but he claimed that his basic motivation was educating "foreign masses on the American way of life" (p. 4). During three overseas trips since the war, Rheinstrom (1947a) had had numerous conversations with people in high office and "the man in the street," and he was apparently alarmed at the lack of appreciation for America and its system of free enterprise. "Having seen our guns and eaten our food, they assume we are rich and powerful. They haven't the slightest idea why." Still, he hoped that things could change. "If people in England, and France, and Sweden, and Russia, can be introduced to the simple idea of free enterprise, they are going to reach for it." Expressing his "fundamental distaste" for government expenditures, he acknowledged that the job of changing European minds exceeded what private interests could do on their own, and "unless the job is done, there won't be any private business."

General Electric CEO Philip Reed, who also served as chairman of the United States Associates of the International Chamber of Commerce and was a prominent member of the CED, was another strong Benton supporter. He made a powerful address to the New York Financial Writers Association in early 1947. While quick to argue that "America must maintain a strong, modern military machine" (Sabath, 1947, p. A2981), Reed proposed three tools for reducing the prospects of a costly war. This included the expansion of trade and free flow of products across international borders and expanded international travel for the purpose of "exchanging intelligence or

information with our neighbors abroad." Another key was a continuous exchange of "facts" with other nations: "Either we present the facts, along the line established by the Mundt bill, or we leave it to the Kremlin to explain our motives" (p. A2982).

By mid-1947, the OIC was enjoying considerable press support. Of the 120 editorial clippings collected by the State Department's Budget Bureau, 70% disapproved of the attempt by the House Subcommittee on Appropriations to further cut the OIC's budget. Several major newspapers carried comments in favor of the OIC almost daily. Except for prominent conservative broadcaster Fulton Lewis, radio commentators across the country also showed their support, as did overseas correspondents (Benton, 1947c, p. 5).

Meanwhile, the congressional fight over the OIC continued. Czech-born politician Adolph Joachim Sabath (D-IL) (1947) chastised Republicans for delaying action on the "Foreign Information Bill" (p. A2980). The long-term House member questioned their obsession with "reducing the budget regardless of whom it hurts" (p. A2981). When the country was "spending almost half of its income" on military and atomic energy "in insurance against war," it refused to spend an additional few million to prevent a war.

Fueled by this support, and much to the State Department's relief, the House voted overwhelmingly to pass the Mundt Bill in 1947 (Mundt, 1947, p. A3352). Benton was pleased with the $12.4 million in congressional funding allotted to the OIC for the following year. Still, due to budgets cuts, changes had to be made. Allocations for Voice of America's budget were reduced from $7.8 million to $6.2 million. The previous budget of $1.4 million for the International Press and Publications Division, which produced the *Wireless Bulletin* and *Amerika*, was cut nearly in half. Funds for overseas libraries and the Exchange of Persons Program were reduced. The only program to receive the full amount ($3.4 million) requested was UNESCO (Benton, 1947d, pp. 1–2). To help streamline its operations, the OIC consolidated its 10 operating divisions into four.

The ongoing fights over the OIC's mission took a toll on Benton. In September 1947, a little over 2 years after accepting the assistant secretary position, and a few months before the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, popularly referred to as the Smith–Mundt Act, was voted into law, he resigned his State Department post to work for the United Nations. His replacement, George V. Allen, made sure of a seamless transformation.

Democracy = Free Enterprise

After spending several months in Western Europe, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. confirmed that "improbable and unsavory things about America are being widely circulated" (Schwabe, 1947) and that the United States was "losing the battle for men's minds" to the Soviet Union. The Massachusetts Republican, who would later be appointed as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, suggested additional forms of persuasion, including the use of official funds to place American news, music, and entertainment in international media, to supplement the State Department's effort. The

EAA enthusiastically welcomed the idea. The association stressed the overlap between its work and the official U.S. agenda, saying that "in some instances, it may be difficult to determine where the interests of the State Department begin and ours end" (Powers, 1946).

As the State Department soon realized, providing "a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government" (U.S. Department of State, 1945a, p. 5) was not easy, given how Americans held varying opinions on most matters and represented a wide range of ethnic groups and cultures. One core problem was Americans' understanding of, and commitment to, "free enterprise" as defined by the CED and the American business community. A series of wartime polls had shown strong support for the social-democratic aspects of Roosevelt's New Deal. A 1942 *Fortune* poll, for example, found high levels of support for full employment, unemployment insurance, and government regulation of banks. While 40% of the respondents opposed socialism, fully 25% declared themselves in favor of it; 34% were undecided. As the trade publication *Advertising Age* ("Stuart Chase Book Points Way to Postwar Goals," 1942) remarked: "The American people do not want new 'systems' or new ideologies, but they want jobs, public works, medical care, and social security . . . . They want the deed, not the word." In 1943, a Gallup poll found that only three in 10 Americans could define "free enterprise" ("What's Free Enterprise?" 1943). The remaining 70% were either ignorant of the concept or had a "definite antagonism" toward it. Five years later, only 18% of the adult respondents to a Roper poll cited "the right to private ownership of business" as one of the two most important freedoms in America (Lettinger, 1948, pp. 6–7).

Educating America: The Freedom Train

While Americans' enthusiasm for "free enterprise" was unclear when the war ended, the State Department and the large segment of corporate America that advocated an internationalist approach to information, trade, and commerce operated on the assumption that free enterprise was natural, proper, and beloved. This was the message to be sent to other nations. But selling this notion abroad would be undermined if the idea that capitalism was as American as apple pie faced vocal, active opposition on the home front.

In the spring of 1947, after more than a year's preparation, the Advertising Council assisted the ANA and AAAA's Joint Committee on Understanding Our Economic System with a massive campaign to foster understanding of "the American Economic System" among Americans. The campaign centered on "patriotism," defined as the unconditional acceptance of free enterprise ("Ad Drive Set to Aid Free Enterprise," 1947; Griffith, 1983 p. 399). The intent was to promote "the U.S. economy as a uniquely productive system of free enterprise, and of America as a dynamic, classless, and benignly consensual society" (Griffith, 1983, p. 388). Similar campaigns, including "People's Capitalism" and "The Miracle of America," were likewise designed to promote a capitalistic worldview to Americans and reflected the ideological overlap between the postwar agendas of business and government.

Perhaps, the most visible domestic public relations campaign in this regard came later in 1947, when the American Heritage Foundation (AHF), led by advertising executive Thomas D'Arcy Brophy, who was a prominent member of both the Advertising Council and the CED, launched the "Freedom Train." During its 13-month journey, the train traveled to 322 towns and cities across the United States, bringing people aboard to view original drafts of the Constitution and other documents of national significance lent to the AHF by institutions like the National Archives and the Library of Congress. The documents reflected an idealized vision of American history, one that tried to merge and reconcile positive abstractions such as "individual freedoms and the democratic process" (Little, 1993, p. 37) and "the abundance and opportunity of capitalism" with broader social tensions and concerns as "the essence of Americanism" (p. 38).

As towns across America prepared for the train's arrival, the AHF helped plan "Rededication Weeks," inviting individual citizens to make a "Freedom Pledge"—a commitment to the view that

> "the sanctity of the individual" represents "the essence of democracy" and that "freedom of enterprise, protection of minorities, rights of labor—and all the rights and liberties [Americans] enjoy under the Constitution and Bill of Rights—rest upon this doctrine." (Spring, 2011, p. 34)

Guides with promotional ideas and practical suggestions for how to organize "School Days" and "Women's Days" were supplied to organizers ahead of the train's arrival, along with strategies for involving local media (p. 35).

More than 26,000 newspaper advertisements announced the effort, and 3,000 billboards were placed along the route. To encourage discussions about the train's message, the Advertising Council distributed more than 1.5 million copies of a booklet on "the duties and privileges of citizenship" to schools and civic groups in preparation for the exhibit (Griffith, 1983, p. 399) and the Freedom Train's effort to define what it meant to be an American. *Printers' Ink* (Smith, 1947) reasoned that if American business could sell the country's economic system to its own people, similar campaigns could be deployed to "stop the purveyors of foreign ideologies in their tracks!" Inspired by the exhibit's success, well-known journalist and radio commentator Drew Pearson arranged for "Freedom Trains" to travel across Italy and France, the two European countries with the most active communist parties. Decorated with American flags, the trains carried privately donated food and medicine for distribution. Speeches by American and local officials reminding recipients "where the food came from" accompanied their frequent stops (Wall, 2008, p. 247).

Educating Europe About America: The Common Council for American Unity

In the fall of 1948, the Common Council for American Unity (formerly the Foreign Language Information Service), which had spent three decades "orienting foreign

language groups to the American way" (Munson & Lewis, 1949, p. 3), sponsored an extensive survey of 1,702 "qualified observers of opinion" in European countries to "cover the principal assertions of Communist and other hostile propaganda." Developed by Elmo Roper with the State Department's assistance, the survey also mapped European attitudes on issues including the Marshall Plan, U.S. national and foreign policy, American news media, and American labor. Most respondents viewed the United States as a democracy that protected individuals' rights and freedom. Yet, the organizers worried about the sizable minority who regarded America as "imperialistic," particularly regarding economic policy Also very troubling was that one third of respondents said that American "Big Business" was driving U.S. foreign policy, and 25% said that America was "trying to force the American brand of capitalism on Europe" (p. 70). Respondents' views on "the Negro question" was similarly disconcerting. One out of four respondents said that "Americans persecute the Negro"; some pointed to America's hypocrisy in rejecting Nazi race theories while continuing to discriminate against and persecute its own citizens. To correct these impressions, the Common Council stressed the ongoing importance of "telling the American story" (Munson & Lewis, 1949, p. 10). And while the government clearly had a large role to play, everybody, including the motion picture industry, America's labor unions, and America's foreign language groups, needed to pitch in.

Henry Lee Munson (1949b), who had overseen the Common Council's European survey, proposed a continuation of the Freedom Train project, with the AHF in charge. Munson's goal was to build ongoing synergy between domestic sentiments and their international dissemination. Domestically, the goal was to cultivate an appreciation for America's new responsibilities as a world leader. Internationally, it should utilize the resulting sentiments to "improve European opinion of the United States and Western democracy" (p. 1). The AHF would coordinate the 312 regional Freedom Train Committees that it had created to work on the project and to persuade "national leaders of labor unions, social, civic, fraternal, veteran, religious and other national groups to work vertically within their own organization" (Munson, 1949b, p. 2). While stressing the non-governmental nature of the effort, the AHF would work closely with the State Department in conveying to Europeans the growing domestic consensus created by the Freedom Committees. The project should encourage "all groups in the country" (p. 1) to think about "America's good points" and their "joint responsibility as Americans."

Munson (1949a, p. 7) suggested help from "outstanding authorities" to publish a series of articles to distribute in the U.S. and beyond. Each article should nail down what the Common Council deemed to be a misconception about America. Mentioned as potential contributors were composer, music critic, and promoter of classical music Joseph Deems Taylor; playwright and Nobel Laureate in Literature Eugene O'Neill; bestselling novelist Louis Bromfield; and museum director and curator Francis Taylor. Munson was delighted that Eleanor Roosevelt, one of the Common Council's sponsors, had already committed to writing an article for the American foreign language press, since the European press would quite likely pick this up. The project also called for each of the 48 states to make films about the state. In addition to help from the

Common Council, contributors could count on advice from the State Department's film division; the department, which showed "American education and documentary films to more than 10 million persons each month outside the U.S.A.," promised to help secure "broad distribution of such films throughout the world."

Misfires included a highly criticized collaboration between the State Department, NBC, and CBS in 1948. Broadcast on Voice of America, *Know North America* took listeners on dramatized journeys through individual American states. Quakers in Pennsylvania were described as "a social problem" (Graham, 2015, p. 168) because of their pacifism; Wyoming's Native Americans were said to live "naked and feathered"; and African Americans in Alabama were "free and happy and of the tragic times [of slavery] only songs remain." Another broadcast focused on New York City mansions and "apartments of millionaires" to dispel the myth that "all blacks were poor in the United States" (Parry-Giles, 2002, p. 37); it characterized Harlem as "the Paradise of Negroes" where "colored millionaires live." Congressional leaders across the aisle were unimpressed with the State Department's work, fearing that instead of elevating foreigners' impressions of the United States, the broadcasts might stoke their concerns (p. 39).

Munson (1949b) also had ideas for how American firms with business interests in Europe and the American tourist industry could develop programs that would improve the U.S. reputation in Europe. He proposed a set of private alternatives to the State Department's program for inviting journalists and educators to "visit and tour the United States to see for themselves" (p. 6). The program, which still hinged on the AHF's acceptance, read like a private counterpart to the IOC. In addition, it proposed keeping track of the number of American "gangster movies" sent abroad and seeking out news and articles to counter "sensational coverage of [American] fringe activities" and put them in "proper perspective" (p. 4).

In 1947, Toledo mayor Michael V. DiSalle had urged Americans to write letters to their European friends and relatives to correct distorted communist propaganda and tell them about the opportunities offered in America. Inspired by the effort, Secretary of State James Byrnes told his department to contact editors of Italian-language papers in the United States and ask them to have readers send stories about America's unselfish goodwill toward Italy and how America was helping Italy toward postwar rehabilitation to friends and relatives in Italy (Wall, 2008).

In 1949, Munson (1949b) proposed an expansion of those letter-writing activities to include the 35 million Americans with relatives in European countries. Counting on support from major religious, civic, and veterans' groups, the Common Council also told the letter writers to ask their relatives to join "Friends of America" organizations in their home countries (p. 5). The response from American foreign-language newspapers was positive. Munson was delighted when the State Department gave "top level and vigorous support" (p. 2) to the project. For example, the German-language newspaper *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung und Herold* was asked to explain the many misconceptions held by German citizens, particularly with reference to the Marshall Plan, because of communist propaganda, and to ask readers to write to their German relatives to set the record straight:

> However doubtful individuals in Germany can be about official propaganda, they do believe what is written to them by their own relatives and friends, particularly when the information is backed up by the individual experience of the letter writer. For example, when the Russians tell the Germans that the people in the United States are starving, there probably is no better answer the Germans can receive than a letter from a relative on the other side saying that he recently purchased a new sofa for the living room, or plans to buy a new car. (Ridder, 1949, p. 1)

The letter-writing aspect of the Common Council's project was well received, but the rest of the project, which hinged on the AHF's assistance, continued to lag. Facing immense pressure from the State Department to take on the project, Brophy (1949) worried that it might be too much for his AHF to handle. Assistant Secretary Allen reminded Brophy that misconceptions about America were increasingly prevalent, stressing the "paramount importance" of having "groups of private citizens undertake programs of education to combat these falsehoods" (U.S. Department of State, 1950, p. 1). The State Department wrote, "the task of winning the peace lacks the drama of arms and men, but it is not less important" (p. 2). Despite heavy pressure, however, the AHF opted to devote its resources elsewhere.

Section 5: The Advertising Council's "Overseas Information" Campaign

The Marshall Plan, which won Senate Foreign Relations Committee approval in November 1947, provided basic supplies and financial support for the rebuilding of war-devastated regions. Along the lines developed by the CED, it sought to remove trade barriers and modernize European industry. The goal was to transform Western Europe into a trade partner; the aid would serve as a counterforce against popular left-wing movements and Soviet communism. Thus, the State Department continued to emphasize the need to help European aid recipients understand the initiative and appreciate the American benevolence behind it. It was important that the program be accompanied by "full and continuous publicity . . . as to the purpose, source, character, and amounts of the commodities made available by the United States" (Marshall, 1947b, p. 11).

Still, getting the 16 European nations that were part of the program to fully appreciate their benefactor was a challenge. Using its position as the most influential trade publication for the U.S. mass media and promotional industries, the advertising trade magazine *Printers' Ink* called for a special committee of businessmen to create advertisements and publicity aimed at selling the American way of life to Europeans. It warned:

> Unless some form of organized publicity and advertising campaign is conducted overseas in the areas that will be affected by the Marshall plan, the U.S. will spend the most money, and the U.S.S.R. will get the votes . . . . [U]nless the people in Europe are told these facts, the primary objective of the Marshall plan can't be attained. (Smith, 1947).

Europeans were about to receive a large share of America's peacetime production, and the United States would miss out on a great propaganda opportunity if the bounty was not accompanied by the right message.

The head of the EAA's Information Committee, Henry R. Webel, jumped on the idea, stressing the need to explain the American free enterprise system to the international community. He warned that for a hard-hitting campaign along these lines to be successful, it could not be carried out "by government counter-propaganda, by congressional junkets or by trying to bribe ourselves into the hearts of the people" ("'Sell America' Abroad, Export Admen Are Urged," 1947). The job demanded experts in export advertising, who had an "excellent opportunity to set the record straight by including the messages of Americanism."

By early 1948, a Senate majority vote had made the OIC a permanent part of foreign policy. While the resulting Smith–Mundt Act was a victory for the State Department, funding for the OIC's program was still a problem. Inspired by the EAA's campaign proposal, the department contacted the Advertising Council with a request for assistance on an "overseas advertising campaign to generate better understanding and knowledge of American democracy" ("Advertising News and Notes," 1948), and to help Europeans understand and appreciate the Marshall Plan.

The State Department was so enthusiastic about the promotional plan that at one point it considered implementing its own form of "direct government advertising" (Macy, 1948b). Cooler heads soon prevailed. Political advertising by the department would quite likely be interpreted as propaganda, not only by people in other countries but by domestic critics of all stripes. However, if the effort could be funneled through private channels with the State Department's involvement obscured, these accusations could be avoided, and the effort might be far more successful (U.S. Department of State, 1947b). By late January, the Ad Council accepted the project, initially called "the United States good-will campaign abroad" (Macy, 1948a). Familiar with the Council's track record, the EAA willingly withdrew its own plans and pledged support for the new endeavor (Macy, 1948b; U.S. Department of State, 1948d).

The State Department took an active role in ensuring that the campaign complemented the OIC's goals and strategies, offering direct suggestions on how potential advertisers should word their copy. Copy themes reflecting the company's brand and mission were encouraged because of their ability to yield "double results" (U.S. Department of State, 1948e, p. 1), creating goodwill and increased sales for the advertiser while impressing foreign readers with "intimate examples of the beneficial aspects of the American way of life, and how it can help other countries to help themselves" by emulation. Ads with abstract promises of "liberty" were not recommended because, "stacked up against a Communist ad, which promises individual security, they stand no other chance of being believed and acted upon than some other unproved promise of a brighter future" (Underhill, 1948c, p. 1). As a later memo (U.S. Department of State, 1948h) delineated, the campaign's primary audience was "non-Communist left leaning elements"—"basically socialistic" individuals who were "extremely suspicious of any message, other than straight product promotion,

conveyed over the signature of an American firm." Therefore, "the greatest care must be taken not to offend the very elements which it is most in our interest to win over."

As would become increasingly evident throughout the campaign, the State Department insisted on micromanaging the project while simultaneously insisting that its involvement be kept under wraps. The requests for oversight and secrecy exceeded all previous Council campaigns. For example, while the call to a select group of industry leaders for exploratory meetings to gauge export advertisers' interest in the "goodwill campaign" officially came from the Advertising Council, the State Department instructed the Council on strategy (U.S. Department of State, 1948h).

The campaign differed from the Council's earlier domestic projects in other respects as well. Until this point, all Ad Council campaigns had taken the form of public service messages integrated into advertisements for products and services, but when it came to the "Overseas Information" campaign, the State Department had more ambitious plans. In a move that echoed the OIC's operating procedures, it requested the direct participation of magazines and radio and asked that manufacturers with international markets include "the truth about the United States" (U.S. Department of State, 1948a) on their product labels and package enclosures as well as leaflets, bill postings, house organs, personnel training, motion pictures, and exhibits. The State Department promised advice, suggestions, and final reviews of industry promotional material that explained the Marshall Plan to ensure that it would "fit the interests and problems of specific countries" and "not be at variance with government programs and objectives" (U.S. Department of State, 1948a). The key to a successful campaign hinged on "close cooperation between skilled copywriters" and the State Departments experts "who know the psychology and reactions of the audience addressed" (Stone, 1948, p. 2). Advertisers were promised that a well-executed campaign would be "a good investment" (U.S. Department of State, 1948k, p. 8). In the words of Advertising Council president Allan Wilson (1949), "what is good for the country is good for business" and "what is good for the world is good for American business" (p. 9). Wilson even suggested that the campaign's slogan be changed from "Selling America Overseas" to "Saving America Overseas" (p. 1).

An elaborate unveiling of the campaign took place in April 1948, a few days before the Marshall Plan was implemented across Europe. The White House Treaty Room event was attended by representatives from the State Department and White House, as well as journalists and individuals from national advertising organizations. Secretary of State Marshall and John Steelman, an assistant to President Truman, presented the campaign (Stone, 1948). Also attending were the presidents and vice presidents from 16 major companies, including Standard Oil, IBM, and General Electric, who were urged to help "sell" Europeans on American democracy and the Marshall Plan.

Regarding the advertisements, businesses were advised to provide "honest insight into some phase of typical American liberty" (U.S. Department of State, 1948e, p. 1), such as mentions of how average Americans could own stock in large companies. Another State Department idea was to show immigrants as an assimilated, integral part of industry to audiences in the "old country." The government emphasized the importance of clarity and simplicity of expression and was asked to use

country-specific copy to stress the advantageous aspects of the Marshall Plan, with ads tailored directly to each of the 16 targeted countries (Stone, 1948).

Working hard to gain advertisers' support, the Council stressed their importance in the "world-wide struggle against the further spread of communism," because "the character of our governmental, social and industrial organizations and the lives of all Americans" hung in the balance (U.S. Department of State, 1948f, p. 1):

> The United States today is in a position not unlike that of a company which is introducing its product into a new market. We know the merchandise is good. We know the competition cannot deliver what they promise. But our knowledge will not sell the merchandise. We need a comprehensive promotional program so every man, woman, and child in the potential market will learn how superior our product really is. (U.S. Department of State, 1948k, p. 7)

Bartow H. Underhill (1948a), the State Department's liaison with the Advertising Council, warned that the Soviets would most certainly "make capital of the Department's cooperation with industry or private interests," given their view of American democracy as "just a front for the ruthless dictatorship of monopoly capital and domination by imperialist concerns." He worried that ideological enemies would claim that big business was running the United States and that Congress was in its pocket. Thus, while pledging its full support and availability "at all times for consultation and guidance" (U.S. Department of State, 1948e), and obviously calling most of the shots, the State Department did not want to give the impression that it dictated what advertisers could and could not say.

Advertisers were not eager to participate; however, many worried that the campaign would be ineffective. "Almost nobody listens to radio in Europe, and people there do not read in comparison with Americans" (U.S. Department of State, 1948i, p. 2), one concerned advertiser complained. "There is no publishing business in Europe like there is here—no power of the press . . . . [I]t would be very dangerous to believe we would get very far in Europe with the same approach we use here." Advertisers also pointed to difficulty in obtaining complete current data, including rates and circulation numbers, for international publications. No association or agency had the ability or the inclination to collect such information and keep it up to date, so it tended to be spotty and unreliable. They also worried about securing advertising space in European publications given a paper shortage (U.S. Department of State, 1948g). The State Department quickly assured them that this would not be a problem: It would buy ad space in European magazines and newspapers using highly sought-after American dollars. Moreover, it said, the Bureau of Internal Revenue considered international product advertising a legitimate tax-deductible expenditure (U.S. Department of State, 1948f).

In November, the Advertising Council (1948) released its long-anticipated guidebook *Advertising: A New Weapon in the World-Wide Fight for Freedom; A Guide for American Business Firms Advertising in Foreign Countries*. Citing a series of "anti-American" statements used by the Soviets, the guide explained the two major

campaign objectives and suggested how advertisers could address "misconceptions" about America and use their international copy to subtly explain the rationale behind the Marshall Plan (U.S. Department of State, 1948b, pp. 1–3). Unlike the Council's domestic campaigns, the guide offered no sample advertisements. It merely listed issues and solutions that individual advertisers could apply to their own campaigns. Stressing the effectiveness of ads that promoted both a product and the cause, the guide warned against bragging ("The richness of America is distasteful to many" [p. 10]). Advertisers should avoid using statements that communists could "twist" to use as proof that the U.S. government was a tool of business (or vice versa). They were also asked to refrain from claims that might suggest that America was seeking to "impose its system on the rest of the world."

The Council cooperated. In addition to help from advertisers, it requested assistance from newspapers, magazines, and radio with international exposure. "American industries doing overseas advertising cannot avoid being on the information front" ("Overseas Advtg. Guide," 1948), wrote the trade publication *Tide*. "If the copy is right—if it says what will best promote understanding—American industry will help win the world-wide war of ideas." Manufacturers with limited foreign advertising budgets were encouraged to be particularly creative. The Topps Company, which made Bazooka bubble gum, offered a good example. It designed a small booklet based on the Ad Council's themes, and included this with its foreign shipments (U.S. Department of State, 1948l).

Westinghouse incorporated campaign themes into its international advertising. Its house organ *Westinghouse International* ran a monthly column discussing project themes. Recordings were sent to approximately 10,000 radio dealers overseas; these were tailored to specific countries, using *Advertising: A New Weapon* as inspiration (U.S. Department of State, 1948c). Westinghouse also developed plans for using campaign themes in speeches to its overseas managers. By November, the Council reported "numerous requests" from interested firms engaged in international business and from American publications with foreign distribution. The Council arranged a luncheon for industry executives, featuring a presentation by the EAA accompanied by sample ads and a screening of the newly released Time-Life documentary *The Answer to Stalin* (U.S. Department of State, 1949). Campaign liaison Underhill (1948b) suggested that a pep talk by a Russian who had "gone over" to the American side might be a good way to pique American advertisers' interest and commitment.

Despite these efforts, advertisers' response to the campaign remained lackluster. At a key meeting to discuss the project in early 1949, less than half of the 260 top-level invitees showed up, suggesting that the campaign might be in serious trouble (Advertising Council, 1949b, p. 4). The State Department criticized the Ad Council for poor planning and preparation. This, in turn, caused Council executives to worry that they had gotten in over their heads. Their first international campaign seemingly required far more skills and resources than most previous projects and was headed toward failure (Advertising Council, 1948–1949; Begg, 1948). Eager to pass blame, Underhill (1949b) explained that he had tried to tell the Advertising Council that its successful domestic formula would not automatically translate to the international

field, but to no avail. He claimed that repeated pleas to get the Council to do original, realistic thinking about the foreign arena based on the State Department's facts, research, and experience had been met with insurmountable caution and a stubborn determination to cling to established principles and operations. He now realized that the Council's leaders lacked "any real experience or information in foreign psychological reactions," and that they had based their strategies "on experiences with American audiences and with American techniques."

Emphasizing that "the Government's role in information activities must remain supplemental to that of private enterprise," Assistant Secretary Allen (1949) was not ready to quit. If anything, he stressed the "very real and urgent need to develop such efforts on a far greater scale." Aware of the pressure, the Council was ready to concede and let some other organization take over its role (Advertising Council, 1949a, p. 4; Begg, 1949a).

When push came to shove, however, no other organization was willing to take on the task, mainly citing a lack of time and resources. Thus, unless the State Department wanted to pull the plug on the campaign, it was stuck with the Advertising Council, which was doing what it could to turn the effort around (Begg, 1949b). Reflecting on its own role, the State Department speculated that better instructions might improve matters. One of its recommendations, which was immediately rejected by the Council, included the creation of a separate Council division to prepare and place advertising in international publications media.

Expressing vague optimism, the leader of the EAA, Charles W. Jackson (1949), reported an increasing number of inquiries from advertisers interested in effectively written ads for their foreign markets. By 1949, U.E. export companies were selling more than $1 billion worth of American goods to other countries each month. According to Jackson, this put them in a unique position to use advertising as a tool for international understanding and "a last chance to save our way of life."

Still, the State Department's demands, including specifically tailoring advertisements to fit individual countries' political, cultural, and social sensitivities, were an overwhelming task for the relatively small number of advertising creatives and strategic planners who were working on the project. The "Overseas Information" campaign did not provide advertisers with slogans, ready-made announcements, or examples of how messages could be incorporated into product advertising (Begg, 1949c). Underhill (1949a) recognized that the Council had reasons to feel "overwhelmed with the magnitude of the job" (p. 1). Despite efforts, the actual number of contributing advertisers continued to disappoint. In late 1950, after two and a half years, the Council decided to end the effort.

This, however, did not mean that the Advertising Council abandoned its commitment to countering "foreign propaganda," or that it cut ties with the State Department. The start of the Korean War in 1950 intensified the global divide along ideological lines and plunged the United States deeper into the throes of a "Cold War," further strengthening the codependence between government and business. When the Advertising Council (1949–1950) concluded the "Overseas Information" campaign, it expressed hope for future collaborations "with a well-financed organization" that

could "devote its major energies to anti-Communist informational activities overseas." The wish would soon come true.

Conclusion

The term "cold war" refers to a conflict in which the use of maximal military force to achieve victory is not an option. In the postwar nuclear era, a "hot war" would lead to mutually ensured destruction. This elevated propaganda from the periphery to the center of the struggle for victory. This point remains obscure and underdeveloped in scholarship; its implications deserve far more consideration. One need only recall the saying "The first casualty of war is truth."

The Korean War is often regarded as the point when rapidly deteriorating U.S.–Soviet relations led to what would become a four-decade war, where each side saw its own global triumph as requiring the failure of its adversary. By 1950, any significant domestic opposition to the United States having not only a global military presence, but a propaganda apparatus to match, had all but disappeared. By the early 1950s, such "information" activities enjoyed bipartisan support and were regarded as essential for combating communism. Fear and hatred of communism led isolationists to abandon their opposition to internationalism. Exemplified by Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI), the political right remained suspicious of internationalists, but now seeing the latter as being insufficiently anti-communist in exercising U.S. power globally and domestically in the struggle against anything right-wing forces regarded as remotely sympathetic to communism. Despite their mutual support of global information services, there was little love lost between the sides. When Benton won the Connecticut Senate race as a Democrat in 1950, he quickly introduced a resolution to expel McCarthy from the Senate.

By 1948 the U.S. government had established a permanent global propaganda apparatus to do its bidding. The numerous campaigns between 1945 and 1948 provided invaluable experience and helped clarify the best ways to proceed. As I have demonstrated here, much of the impetus for a strong propaganda (or "information") apparatus was driven by the largest U.S. corporations and their associations; these regarded expanded markets as crucial to their growth, and understood that a government that was active globally on the ideological front was necessary to their economic success. This corporate influence permeated the creation and subsequent development of U.S. propaganda/information. Indeed, in the 1940s, the State Department used its commercial partners as a convenient smokescreen for activities not authorized by Congress, including campaigns that constituted government propaganda directed at U.S. citizens. The American public's trust in the commercial media, combined with official assurance that propaganda was something only bad guys did, allowed these activities to go undetected right after the war.

In the immediate postwar years, corporate groups had already worked on their own and with the Advertising Council to create major campaigns promoting the idea that democracy and human freedom were inseparable from free enterprise, which was another way to say capitalism as it existed in the United States. It was a short journey from that presupposition to some of the greatest mistakes of U.S. foreign policy: if a

nation claimed to be democratic while also being hostile to U.S. capitalist interests, that was a problem, often a very big problem, for the United States. The converse was similarly tragic: to the extent that a nation adequately served U.S. capitalist interests, the United States would have no more than nominal concern about its lack of commitment to democracy and human rights.

Within the business community, the advertising industry was central to the creation of the propaganda apparatus. Indeed, the visionary of the State Department's information plans was none other than the cofounder of a major advertising agency, who had powerful connections to big business, advertising, academia, and the mass media. The role of William Benton and the advertising industry has received insufficient appreciation in studies of the United States' postwar international information activities.

A few other issues that I touched on became central concerns about subsequent U.S. propaganda efforts. First, the U.S. media were deeply concerned about any governmental infringement on their editorial operations. The Smith–Mundt Act spelled out such concerns. From the beginning, however, without any Orwellian intrusions by the government, the dominant U.S. media produced generous, sympathetic treatment of whatever the government was doing with its international information programs. The broadcast networks, where Benton had close relationships from his Madison Avenue days, were especially supportive.

Second, almost simultaneous with launching international propaganda campaigns, the State Department and other players were concerned that domestic public opinion failed to support their international claims. The problem was simple: selling the idea abroad that Americans embraced free enterprise might require conducting campaigns domestically, to create the appearance that Americans equated free enterprise with democracy, at least rhetorically. In short, once a propaganda program is launched in earnest, it encourages synergetic efforts on the domestic level.

These problems emerged almost immediately in the early 1950s. Both internationally and domestically, an increasing number of America's cultural and media institutions became active partners in the State Department's propaganda effort and willingly cooperated with the CIA cities (Belmonte, 2008; Saunders, 2000; Wall, 2008). A 1951 collaboration between the AHF and the Advertising Council is an excellent example. The "Crusade for Freedom" combined the lessons already learned and pitched its pleas and messages on both sides of the iron curtain with impressive synergy. Determined to "win the 'cold war' against the Kremlin," the campaign collected funds from American groups and individuals to support Radio Free Europe (RFE), a service that was presented to publics on both sides of the iron curtain as a private counterpart to the State Department's Voice of America.

Participants on both sides of the Atlantic were led to believe that RFE was a grassroots movement, funded by America's business community and ordinary citizens and unaffiliated with the U.S. government. They were led to believe that, unlike the mass media in totalitarian states, the commercial American media were unsusceptible to government interference and would never allow themselves to be used for propaganda purposes. By highlighting the many small private contributors, who donated $4 million in 1952 alone, the U.S. government succeeded in keeping its own involvement hidden. It deceived not only Eastern European countries but also its own citizens. Only

after classified documents were released in the 1970s did the public learn that RFE was created, managed, and largely funded by the State Department and the CIA. At no time in the first decades of its existence did the American "free press" challenge the official story; instead, it legitimized it. Indeed, any American who questioned the official line was marked as a pawn of communist propaganda.

If the justification for the U.S. propaganda campaigns had been the Cold War and the threat of Soviet world domination, then one might expect the collapse of the Soviet Union to have led to calls for ending all related propaganda programs. Much like the notion that the end of the Cold War might bring a "peace dividend" (i.e., military budgets could return to peacetime levels, leaving the remaining funds available for social welfare), so there might have been a "truth dividend," with the billions spent by the U.S. government on propaganda devoted to funding noncommercial media and independent journalism, as in some other democracies. Alas, neither occurred. Propaganda (and militarism) remain defining features of our nation and our times.

Author's Note

Many references cited in this monograph are held in institutional archives, and the full reference information has been abbreviated in the reference list. The Advertising Council Archives can be accessed at the University of Illinois in Urbana, Illinois, United States; the William Benton Papers can be accessed at the University of Chicago Archives in Chicago, Illinois, United States; the Thomas D'Arcy Brophy Papers can be accessed at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin, United States; the General Records of the Department of State can be accessed at the National Archives facility in College Park, Maryland, United States; the John W. Gibson Papers can be accessed at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, United States; the Arthur Wilson Page Papers can be accessed at the State Historical Society of Wisconsin in Madison, Wisconsin, United States; the Records of the Office of Management and Budget, the Records of the Office of War Information, and the Records of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion can be accessed at the National Archives facility in College Park, Maryland, United States; and the Harry S. Truman Papers can be accessed at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri, United States.

Acknowledgments

The author is grateful to Robert W. McChesney for feedback and suggestions on numerous monograph drafts. She also thanks Donovan Bisbee, Peggy Ann Brown, Jane Lyle, and Alexandra "Ali" Moll for their assistance with research and editing. The author is grateful to the Campus Research Board at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign for its research support and for providing a semester-long release from teaching.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

1. Earlier versions of the case studies have been appeared in the *Journal of Historical Research in Marketing*, Vol. 8, Issue 1, 2016 and Vol. 10, Issue 4, 2018.
2. During 1945, the OIC was briefly preceded by the Interim International Information Service. To avoid overloading readers with alphabet organizations, I simply refer to the OIC, even in 1945.

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